NEW YORK (Reuters) – One in every eight U.S. households, a record share, ended 2008 behind on their mortgage payments or in the foreclosure process as job losses intensified a housing crisis spawned by lax lending practices, the Mortgage Bankers Association said on Thursday.
With unemployment at a 16-1/2-year high and rising, more borrowers will be late paying or fall into foreclosure this year, said the group's chief economist Jay Brinkmann.
"While California, Florida, Nevada, Arizona and Michigan continue to dominate the delinquency numbers, some of the sharpest increases we saw last quarter in loans 90 days or more delinquent were in Louisiana, New York, Georgia, Texas and Mississippi, signs of the spreading impact of the recession," he said.
U.S. President Barack Obama's $275 billion housing stimulus program will standardize modifications for distressed loans and pave the way for more refinancing.
That should smooth differences caused by various state and company moratoria that temporarily curbed the surge in foreclosures in the fourth quarter, Brinkmann said.
"But keep in mind that there are three drivers to the housing problem, and this program of course addresses mostly the first one," which relate to loan structure, underwriting quality and fraud, Brinkmann said.
The two other major problems still loom large -- an oversupply caused by overbuilding and foreclosures, and unemployment.
A record 11.18 percent of loans on one-to-four unit residences were at least one payment past due or in the foreclosure process in 2008, on a seasonally adjusted basis.
The delinquency rate jumped 2.06 percentage points from a year ago to a record 7.88 percent. The share of loans in the foreclosure process leaped 1.26 percentage point in the year to a record 3.30 percent.
MBA started tracking the data in 1972.
"There are some new states popping up in terms of the big increases," Brinkmann said.
"We see New York being influenced by the layoffs that we've been seeing on Wall Street and some of the rest of the industry associated with that," he noted.
"Some of the Southern states that had construction-related unemployment, whether it was forest product or plywood manufacturing. Some of the tourism industry is now being hit, certainly in Mississippi with the casinos, and in Florida."
In Michigan, where overbuilding was not a problem, supply nonetheless is weighty as people lose jobs and leave the state and strand homes, Brinkmann said.
Subprime adjustable-rate loans and prime ARM loans still drive the late payments, but that is shifting.
Nationwide, 48 percent of subprime ARMs were at least one payment past due and in Florida over 60 percent of subprime ARMs were at least one payment late.
"We will continue to see, however, a shift away from delinquencies tied to the structure and underwriting quality of loans to mortgage delinquencies caused by job and income losses," Brinkmann said.
Of particular concern, he said, is a sharp pickup in joblessness among people with college educations.
By the end of last year, "we saw some sharp pickups in delinquency rates with prime loans and I think that's now going to continue as long as we see unemployment continue to climb among the people most likely to own homes," Brinkmann said.
How high unemployment in that segment of the population gets and how long it stays there are will "determine ultimately how long the prime fixed loan delinquencies continue to climb," he said. "Some of these people do have adequate reserves to last maybe six months or a year without a job, but the longer this thing goes on the quicker they then run through those reserves and their loans go delinquent."
(Editing by Chizu Nomiyama)
Showing posts with label housing. Show all posts
Showing posts with label housing. Show all posts
Thursday, March 5, 2009
Wednesday, March 4, 2009
More Housing UnderWater
NEW YORK (Reuters) – One in five U.S. homeowners with mortgages owe more to their lenders than their properties are worth, and the rate will increase as housing values drop in states that have so far avoided the worst of the crisis, a new study shows.
About 8.31 million properties had negative equity at the end of 2008, up 9 percent from 7.63 million at the end of September, according to the study, released Wednesday by First American CoreLogic. The percentage of "underwater" borrowers rose to 20 percent from 18 percent.
Another 2.16 million properties could go underwater if home prices fall another 5 percent, the study shows.
First American said the value of residential properties fell to $19.1 trillion at year-end from $21.5 trillion a year earlier, with half the decline in California. Forty-three U.S. states and Washington, D.C., were included in the study.
While states such as California, Florida and Nevada were particularly stressed, the study showed worrying signs of deterioration in relatively healthy parts of the nation.
"The economic slowdown is broadening," said Sherrill Shaffer, a banking professor at the University of Wyoming at Laramie and a former Federal Reserve official. "As more people lose jobs, it will be more difficult to sustain the levels of pricing and home ownership, and that is a big factor driving down housing prices in more parts of the country."
Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada and Ohio remained the most stressed states, with 62 percent of underwater borrowers and just 41 percent of mortgages.
Other areas, though, also face more stress. Connecticut, for example, saw a 25 percent increase in homes with negative equity, while Washington, D.C., had a 44 percent increase.
"Even I continue to be surprised at the tentacles of this financial and economic debacle," said Robert MacIntosh, chief economist at Eaton Vance Management in Boston. "More people are being laid off, resulting in reduced income and therefore less consumption. That leaves fewer people with money to buy homes, and the mentality is that people believe they should wait six months rather than buy now. Less demand means falling prices."
Roughly 68 percent of U.S. adults own their own homes, and about two-thirds of these have mortgages. Many economists expect the nation's unemployment rate to rise above 9 percent before the recession ends, up from January's 7.6 percent.
CALIFORNIA, NEVADA UNDER STRESS
California had 1.9 million borrowers with negative equity at year-end, more than any other state, followed by Florida's 1.28 million. About three in 10 borrowers in both states were underwater.
By other measures, Nevada was the most stressed, with 55 percent of owners having negative equity and borrowers on average owing 97 percent of what their homes are worth. About 28 percent owe more than 125 percent of their homes' value.
Michigan had 40 percent of its homeowners underwater, while Arizona had 32 percent.
New York fared best, with just 4.7 percent of borrowers with negative equity and an average 48 percent loan-to-value ratio, though this could change as employment and bonuses slide in the financial services industry.
According to the S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Indices, prices of U.S. single-family homes slumped 18.5 percent in December from a year earlier, the biggest drop in the 21-year history of the data.
Many lenders are taking steps to keep borrowers out of foreclosure. The Obama administration has backed legislation that could broaden powers of bankruptcy judges to modify mortgages for troubled borrowers. Among major lenders, only Citigroup Inc has supported such a plan.
MacIntosh expects housing prices to keep falling until "well into" 2010. "There is no magic bullet or magic arrow here," he said. "It is a question of trying to come up with ideas and seeing what happens. It could take a long time."
First American CoreLogic is an affiliate of title insurance and real estate services company First American Corp.
(Reporting by Jonathan Stempel; Editing by Bernard Orr and John Wallace)
About 8.31 million properties had negative equity at the end of 2008, up 9 percent from 7.63 million at the end of September, according to the study, released Wednesday by First American CoreLogic. The percentage of "underwater" borrowers rose to 20 percent from 18 percent.
Another 2.16 million properties could go underwater if home prices fall another 5 percent, the study shows.
First American said the value of residential properties fell to $19.1 trillion at year-end from $21.5 trillion a year earlier, with half the decline in California. Forty-three U.S. states and Washington, D.C., were included in the study.
While states such as California, Florida and Nevada were particularly stressed, the study showed worrying signs of deterioration in relatively healthy parts of the nation.
"The economic slowdown is broadening," said Sherrill Shaffer, a banking professor at the University of Wyoming at Laramie and a former Federal Reserve official. "As more people lose jobs, it will be more difficult to sustain the levels of pricing and home ownership, and that is a big factor driving down housing prices in more parts of the country."
Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada and Ohio remained the most stressed states, with 62 percent of underwater borrowers and just 41 percent of mortgages.
Other areas, though, also face more stress. Connecticut, for example, saw a 25 percent increase in homes with negative equity, while Washington, D.C., had a 44 percent increase.
"Even I continue to be surprised at the tentacles of this financial and economic debacle," said Robert MacIntosh, chief economist at Eaton Vance Management in Boston. "More people are being laid off, resulting in reduced income and therefore less consumption. That leaves fewer people with money to buy homes, and the mentality is that people believe they should wait six months rather than buy now. Less demand means falling prices."
Roughly 68 percent of U.S. adults own their own homes, and about two-thirds of these have mortgages. Many economists expect the nation's unemployment rate to rise above 9 percent before the recession ends, up from January's 7.6 percent.
CALIFORNIA, NEVADA UNDER STRESS
California had 1.9 million borrowers with negative equity at year-end, more than any other state, followed by Florida's 1.28 million. About three in 10 borrowers in both states were underwater.
By other measures, Nevada was the most stressed, with 55 percent of owners having negative equity and borrowers on average owing 97 percent of what their homes are worth. About 28 percent owe more than 125 percent of their homes' value.
Michigan had 40 percent of its homeowners underwater, while Arizona had 32 percent.
New York fared best, with just 4.7 percent of borrowers with negative equity and an average 48 percent loan-to-value ratio, though this could change as employment and bonuses slide in the financial services industry.
According to the S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Indices, prices of U.S. single-family homes slumped 18.5 percent in December from a year earlier, the biggest drop in the 21-year history of the data.
Many lenders are taking steps to keep borrowers out of foreclosure. The Obama administration has backed legislation that could broaden powers of bankruptcy judges to modify mortgages for troubled borrowers. Among major lenders, only Citigroup Inc has supported such a plan.
MacIntosh expects housing prices to keep falling until "well into" 2010. "There is no magic bullet or magic arrow here," he said. "It is a question of trying to come up with ideas and seeing what happens. It could take a long time."
First American CoreLogic is an affiliate of title insurance and real estate services company First American Corp.
(Reporting by Jonathan Stempel; Editing by Bernard Orr and John Wallace)
Wednesday, January 14, 2009
The Signal For The End Of The Recession
The endless commentators and guests on CNBC or the hardly watched Fox Business channel all have predictions on how and when the recession will end. Here are my thoughts.
A lasting recovery will not begin until the housing market recovers. There is only two indicators to watch and that is the months of supply of new homes and the months of supply of existing homes for sale. As of 11/08 there is a 11.5 months supply of new homes and a 11.2 month supply of existing homes. These two indicators are at or near all time highs. And what will spur the purchase of a new or existing home?
1) Consumer Confidence - consumer confidence is directly related to how secure people feel in their jobs. People defintely cannot buy a house if they are unemployed and will be reluctant to buy a house if they fear losing their job. Consumer confidence will not rebound until the job picture stabilizes.
2) We need first time home buyers to return to the market. Right now people are simply swapping houses. The only way the supply of inventory come down is if new, first home buyers enter the market. What's stopping this? It's not the price (prices are coming down), and it's not the interest rate (rates are coming down). The tightening of credit is limiting the number of new buyers into the market. People will actually have to have a down payment; 5-10-maybe 20%.
3) We're still building too many new homes. Unfortunately new housing construction is still too high to eliminate the backlog of new housing. New housing starts for 2009 are estimated to be 646,000 units, still too high.
Keep your eye on the months of housing supply as an indicator of a lasting recovery. (Tim)
A lasting recovery will not begin until the housing market recovers. There is only two indicators to watch and that is the months of supply of new homes and the months of supply of existing homes for sale. As of 11/08 there is a 11.5 months supply of new homes and a 11.2 month supply of existing homes. These two indicators are at or near all time highs. And what will spur the purchase of a new or existing home?
1) Consumer Confidence - consumer confidence is directly related to how secure people feel in their jobs. People defintely cannot buy a house if they are unemployed and will be reluctant to buy a house if they fear losing their job. Consumer confidence will not rebound until the job picture stabilizes.
2) We need first time home buyers to return to the market. Right now people are simply swapping houses. The only way the supply of inventory come down is if new, first home buyers enter the market. What's stopping this? It's not the price (prices are coming down), and it's not the interest rate (rates are coming down). The tightening of credit is limiting the number of new buyers into the market. People will actually have to have a down payment; 5-10-maybe 20%.
3) We're still building too many new homes. Unfortunately new housing construction is still too high to eliminate the backlog of new housing. New housing starts for 2009 are estimated to be 646,000 units, still too high.
Keep your eye on the months of housing supply as an indicator of a lasting recovery. (Tim)
Friday, December 12, 2008
The Housing Decline Continues
Why home values may take decades to recover Some see 2006 as 'lifetime' peak in prices
By Dennis Cauchon USA TODAY
More room to fall?
For every $100 spent on a house in 1950 the investment rose slightly through 2002, then soared to about $192 in 2006, adjusting for inflation. Then credit dried up, and the bust began.
Rick Wallick moved into a new, three-bedroom $200,000 home in Maricopa, Ariz., in October 2005. Today, the home is worth $80,000.
The disabled software engineer stopped making mortgage payments this month. His $70,000 down payment is now worthless. His dream house will be foreclosed on next year.
"We're so far underwater it's not funny," says Wallick, 57, who had to return to his original home in Oregon to care for a sick family member and tend to his own medical problems. Wallick, one of the hardest-hit victims in one of the states hit hardest by the housing crisis, lost 60% of his home's value in three years.
His story is an extreme example, but home values have fallen so sharply since hitting a historic peak in the spring of 2006 that many Americans are wondering how much more prices can sink.
As painful as the decline has been, history suggests home values still may have a long way to drop and may take decades to return to the heights of 2½ years ago.
"We will never see these prices again in our lifetime, when you adjust for inflation," says Peter Schiff, president of investment firm Euro Pacific Capital of Darien, Conn. "These were lifetime peaks."
The boom in home prices — fueled by heavily leveraged loans built on low or even no down payments — made it easy to forget that housing values had been remarkably stable for a half-century after World War II, rising at roughly the same pace as income and inflation. Prices soared in most of the country — especially in Arizona, California, Florida and Nevada and metro areas of Washington, D.C., and New York — during a brief period of easy lending, especially from 2002 to 2006. That era's over.
So far, home values nationally have tumbled an average of 19% from their peak. As bad as that is, prices would need to fall as least 17% more to reach their traditional relationship to household income, according to a USA TODAY analysis of home prices since 1950. In that scenario, a $300,000 house in 2006 could be worth about $200,000 when real estate prices hit bottom.
The price plunge has wiped out trillions of dollars in home equity and caused the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. Susan Wachter, professor of real estate at the University of Pennsylvania, fears that foreclosures and tight credit could send home prices falling to the point that millions of families and thousands of banks are thrust into insolvency.
"Homes are different than other goods and services," she says. "The fragility of our banking system is tied to the value of homes."
Home values have fallen before — during the Great Depression and in Texas after a 1980s oil boom, for example — but those drops were a response to other economic forces. This time, the housing price collapse is the cause of the nation's broad economic troubles, not just an effect.
"If we have another 20% decline in prices, we'll need another bailout of banks similar to what we just did," Wachter says.
Other economists see a brighter picture in the long term. Wachovia economist Adam York expects home values to keep falling until 2010 but is optimistic they will recover.
"The one saving grace is the population is growing by 3 million people a year," he says. "They need to live somewhere. That means more roofs."
Until recently, homes were stable, unspectacular investments, not get-rich-quick schemes.
Nationally, the typical existing home was worth roughly the same in 2000 as it was in 1950, after adjusting for inflation, according to Yale University economist Robert Shiller.
Newly built homes generally were bigger and more expensive than older houses. As time passed, that meant Americans lived in larger, more valuable homes overall. But a house, once constructed, grew slowly in value. California in the 1970s, Texas in the 1980s and Florida on-and-off for a century were conspicuous exceptions to the rule.
Despite only modest increases in value, homes were smart investments. Owners lived in a house, then got their money back when they sold. That's a better deal than renting. Borrowers got tax breaks, too, and built equity that could be leveraged into bigger houses as their incomes grew.
From 2002 to 2006, houses went from being a tortoise to a hare in the investment world. Home sale profits and relaxed lending standards such as lower down payment requirements and adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) made it possible for buyers of all income levels to pay more for houses.
When the housing bubble began to deflate in 2006, history had a sobering lesson to teach. Home values had closely tracked three common-sense measures for many years:
•Income — Home values floated at about three times average household income from 1950 to 2000. In 2006, the average household income was $66,500. Under the traditional model, home prices should have been about $200,000. Instead, the typical home sold for $301,000.
•Rent — Homes traditionally have sold for about 20 times what it would cost to rent them for a year. In 2006, houses were selling for 32 times annual rent.
•Appreciation — Existing homes grew in value by less than 0.5% per year, after adjusting for inflation, from 1950 to 2000. From 2000 to 2006, home prices rose at an average annualized rate of 8.2% above inflation and peaked with a 12.3% jump in 2005. Housing prices began to fall in the second quarter of 2006.
Inflation could help homes recapture their old prices, if not their value. But when inflation is factored in, home prices might not return to their 2006 peak for many years. Housing prices are meaningless if you don't adjust for inflation, says Schiff, the investment manager.
He points out that gold peaked in 1980 at $850 an ounce in response to inflation and the Iranian hostage crisis. It never recovered. Today, it sells for about $750 an ounce and would have to top $2,000 an ounce when adjusted for inflation to match its value in 1980.
"That's the nature of bubbles," Schiff says. "The price never comes back."
An extreme relaxation of lending standards inflated the housing bubble.
"Shoddy underwriting on mortgages" is the primary cause of the housing crisis, says York, the Wachovia economist. "People got caught off-guard by how bad it was."
Millions of home buyers — poor, rich and middle class — were approved to buy homes at prices that had been out-of-reach just a few years earlier. Lenders offered low introductory "teaser" rates on adjustable rate mortgages and approved borrowers based on artificially low mortgage payments, not the higher ones that took effect later.
What else changed:
•Optional payments on principal — In 2005, 29% of new mortgages allowed borrowers to pay interest only — not principal — or pay less than the interest due and add the cost to the principal. That was up from 1% in 2001, according to Credit Suisse, an investment bank.
• No verification of income — Half of mortgages generated in 2006 required no or minimal documentation of household income, reports Credit Suisse.
•Tiny down payments — In 1989, the average down payment for first-time home buyers was 10%, reports the National Association of Realtors. In 2007, it was 2%.
Low down payments and ARMs gave homeowners enormous financial leverage to pay high home prices. Leverage boosts buying power through debt, the same way a 100-pound woman uses a lever to jack up a 3,000-pound car.
Consider a couple with $20,000 cash. In 2006, they easily could get a 5% down mortgage to buy a $400,000 house. Today, a 10% down payment would limit the couple to a $200,000 house.
"Leverage matters a lot when you buy a house," says University of Wisconsin economist Morris Davis, an expert on housing prices and rents. "We're not going to go back to the days of only 20% (down payment) mortgages, but the days of putting nothing down are long gone."
Easy access to borrowed money reset all housing prices, even those paid by cautious borrowers. People of all income classes moved up a notch, Census Bureau housing data show.
The sale of new homes costing $750,000 or more quadrupled from 2002 to 2006. The construction of inexpensive homes costing $125,000 or less fell by two-thirds. The biggest boom was in the middle. Homes costing $200,000 to $300,000 became affordable to millions of families.
The failed titans of home lending — Countrywide Financial, IndyMac Bank and Washington Mutual — specialized in high-risk, highly leveraged loans.
"The price correction has been severe, rapid and probably permanent because lending standards have changed," says mortgage credit analyst Suzanne Mistretta, a senior director at Fitch Ratings, a bond rating company. "We are not going to see 2006 peak levels for a very, very long time."
This resilient home finance system should recover in a few years, some analysts say.
National Association of Realtors chief economist Lawrence Yun predicts home prices will keep falling in 2009 but could return to their 2006 peak in three years, not counting inflation.
He says the bubble largely was confined to four states — California, Nevada, Florida and Arizona. "People who bought at the peak in those states will need time for prices to recover, even up to five years," he says. Yun says people who buy now "have much less risk of price declines and a great possibility of price gains."
The danger of rapidly falling home prices is that — similar to the Depression — potential buyers and lenders will stay away, fueling even sharper price declines.
During the housing boom, buyers expected prices to rise, so they were quick to buy, borrow and pay a premium. As prices drop, home buyers wait for better deals. says economist Dean Baker of the liberal Center for Economic Policy Research in Washington, D.C.
Lenders want bigger down payments to protect against the falling value of collateral. Homeowners lose equity, so they can't buy other houses. "Price declines can be a self-reinforcing mechanism," Wachter says.
An out-of-control price collapse would have dire consequences, Baker says. Even the most conservative banks would find themselves carrying portfolios of toxic mortgage loans.
If housing prices don't stabilize at traditional levels, financial troubles could spread everywhere — to credit cards, car loans and commercial mortgages, Baker says. "The waves of bad debt will just keep coming," he says.
Baker and Wachter want the U.S. government to take aggressive steps to help homeowners, not just financial institutions. They support expanding programs that restructure troubled mortgages to prevent a flood of foreclosed homes from coming on the market and driving prices below their traditional level.
Rick Wallick is an example of how even cautious borrowers can be hurt by a price collapse. He made a 35% down payment on his house and got a 15-year, fixed-rate mortgage at 5.75%.
Arizona's real estate mess wiped him out anyway. Now that he's in Oregon, he's renting out his Arizona house at a loss and can't afford to keep two homes.
Wallick's Arizona house is surrounded by countless foreclosed homes and empty lots. He told his mortgage company that his December payment will be his last. "It may ruin my credit rating, but I can still buy food," he says.
Shelley McComb used a no-money-down, interest-only ARM to pay $199,000 in December 2006 for a new three-bedroom home near Birmingham, Ala. The house's assessed value briefly rose to $225,000.
Now, she needs to move to Atlanta where her husband got a promotion. The McCombs put their home up for sale in March. After getting no offers, they dropped their price to $179,000. They'd settle for $160,000.
Shelley McComb, 30, who manages a doggie day care center, says, "I wish we'd rented."
By Dennis Cauchon USA TODAY
More room to fall?
For every $100 spent on a house in 1950 the investment rose slightly through 2002, then soared to about $192 in 2006, adjusting for inflation. Then credit dried up, and the bust began.
Rick Wallick moved into a new, three-bedroom $200,000 home in Maricopa, Ariz., in October 2005. Today, the home is worth $80,000.
The disabled software engineer stopped making mortgage payments this month. His $70,000 down payment is now worthless. His dream house will be foreclosed on next year.
"We're so far underwater it's not funny," says Wallick, 57, who had to return to his original home in Oregon to care for a sick family member and tend to his own medical problems. Wallick, one of the hardest-hit victims in one of the states hit hardest by the housing crisis, lost 60% of his home's value in three years.
His story is an extreme example, but home values have fallen so sharply since hitting a historic peak in the spring of 2006 that many Americans are wondering how much more prices can sink.
As painful as the decline has been, history suggests home values still may have a long way to drop and may take decades to return to the heights of 2½ years ago.
"We will never see these prices again in our lifetime, when you adjust for inflation," says Peter Schiff, president of investment firm Euro Pacific Capital of Darien, Conn. "These were lifetime peaks."
The boom in home prices — fueled by heavily leveraged loans built on low or even no down payments — made it easy to forget that housing values had been remarkably stable for a half-century after World War II, rising at roughly the same pace as income and inflation. Prices soared in most of the country — especially in Arizona, California, Florida and Nevada and metro areas of Washington, D.C., and New York — during a brief period of easy lending, especially from 2002 to 2006. That era's over.
So far, home values nationally have tumbled an average of 19% from their peak. As bad as that is, prices would need to fall as least 17% more to reach their traditional relationship to household income, according to a USA TODAY analysis of home prices since 1950. In that scenario, a $300,000 house in 2006 could be worth about $200,000 when real estate prices hit bottom.
The price plunge has wiped out trillions of dollars in home equity and caused the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. Susan Wachter, professor of real estate at the University of Pennsylvania, fears that foreclosures and tight credit could send home prices falling to the point that millions of families and thousands of banks are thrust into insolvency.
"Homes are different than other goods and services," she says. "The fragility of our banking system is tied to the value of homes."
Home values have fallen before — during the Great Depression and in Texas after a 1980s oil boom, for example — but those drops were a response to other economic forces. This time, the housing price collapse is the cause of the nation's broad economic troubles, not just an effect.
"If we have another 20% decline in prices, we'll need another bailout of banks similar to what we just did," Wachter says.
Other economists see a brighter picture in the long term. Wachovia economist Adam York expects home values to keep falling until 2010 but is optimistic they will recover.
"The one saving grace is the population is growing by 3 million people a year," he says. "They need to live somewhere. That means more roofs."
Until recently, homes were stable, unspectacular investments, not get-rich-quick schemes.
Nationally, the typical existing home was worth roughly the same in 2000 as it was in 1950, after adjusting for inflation, according to Yale University economist Robert Shiller.
Newly built homes generally were bigger and more expensive than older houses. As time passed, that meant Americans lived in larger, more valuable homes overall. But a house, once constructed, grew slowly in value. California in the 1970s, Texas in the 1980s and Florida on-and-off for a century were conspicuous exceptions to the rule.
Despite only modest increases in value, homes were smart investments. Owners lived in a house, then got their money back when they sold. That's a better deal than renting. Borrowers got tax breaks, too, and built equity that could be leveraged into bigger houses as their incomes grew.
From 2002 to 2006, houses went from being a tortoise to a hare in the investment world. Home sale profits and relaxed lending standards such as lower down payment requirements and adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) made it possible for buyers of all income levels to pay more for houses.
When the housing bubble began to deflate in 2006, history had a sobering lesson to teach. Home values had closely tracked three common-sense measures for many years:
•Income — Home values floated at about three times average household income from 1950 to 2000. In 2006, the average household income was $66,500. Under the traditional model, home prices should have been about $200,000. Instead, the typical home sold for $301,000.
•Rent — Homes traditionally have sold for about 20 times what it would cost to rent them for a year. In 2006, houses were selling for 32 times annual rent.
•Appreciation — Existing homes grew in value by less than 0.5% per year, after adjusting for inflation, from 1950 to 2000. From 2000 to 2006, home prices rose at an average annualized rate of 8.2% above inflation and peaked with a 12.3% jump in 2005. Housing prices began to fall in the second quarter of 2006.
Inflation could help homes recapture their old prices, if not their value. But when inflation is factored in, home prices might not return to their 2006 peak for many years. Housing prices are meaningless if you don't adjust for inflation, says Schiff, the investment manager.
He points out that gold peaked in 1980 at $850 an ounce in response to inflation and the Iranian hostage crisis. It never recovered. Today, it sells for about $750 an ounce and would have to top $2,000 an ounce when adjusted for inflation to match its value in 1980.
"That's the nature of bubbles," Schiff says. "The price never comes back."
An extreme relaxation of lending standards inflated the housing bubble.
"Shoddy underwriting on mortgages" is the primary cause of the housing crisis, says York, the Wachovia economist. "People got caught off-guard by how bad it was."
Millions of home buyers — poor, rich and middle class — were approved to buy homes at prices that had been out-of-reach just a few years earlier. Lenders offered low introductory "teaser" rates on adjustable rate mortgages and approved borrowers based on artificially low mortgage payments, not the higher ones that took effect later.
What else changed:
•Optional payments on principal — In 2005, 29% of new mortgages allowed borrowers to pay interest only — not principal — or pay less than the interest due and add the cost to the principal. That was up from 1% in 2001, according to Credit Suisse, an investment bank.
• No verification of income — Half of mortgages generated in 2006 required no or minimal documentation of household income, reports Credit Suisse.
•Tiny down payments — In 1989, the average down payment for first-time home buyers was 10%, reports the National Association of Realtors. In 2007, it was 2%.
Low down payments and ARMs gave homeowners enormous financial leverage to pay high home prices. Leverage boosts buying power through debt, the same way a 100-pound woman uses a lever to jack up a 3,000-pound car.
Consider a couple with $20,000 cash. In 2006, they easily could get a 5% down mortgage to buy a $400,000 house. Today, a 10% down payment would limit the couple to a $200,000 house.
"Leverage matters a lot when you buy a house," says University of Wisconsin economist Morris Davis, an expert on housing prices and rents. "We're not going to go back to the days of only 20% (down payment) mortgages, but the days of putting nothing down are long gone."
Easy access to borrowed money reset all housing prices, even those paid by cautious borrowers. People of all income classes moved up a notch, Census Bureau housing data show.
The sale of new homes costing $750,000 or more quadrupled from 2002 to 2006. The construction of inexpensive homes costing $125,000 or less fell by two-thirds. The biggest boom was in the middle. Homes costing $200,000 to $300,000 became affordable to millions of families.
The failed titans of home lending — Countrywide Financial, IndyMac Bank and Washington Mutual — specialized in high-risk, highly leveraged loans.
"The price correction has been severe, rapid and probably permanent because lending standards have changed," says mortgage credit analyst Suzanne Mistretta, a senior director at Fitch Ratings, a bond rating company. "We are not going to see 2006 peak levels for a very, very long time."
This resilient home finance system should recover in a few years, some analysts say.
National Association of Realtors chief economist Lawrence Yun predicts home prices will keep falling in 2009 but could return to their 2006 peak in three years, not counting inflation.
He says the bubble largely was confined to four states — California, Nevada, Florida and Arizona. "People who bought at the peak in those states will need time for prices to recover, even up to five years," he says. Yun says people who buy now "have much less risk of price declines and a great possibility of price gains."
The danger of rapidly falling home prices is that — similar to the Depression — potential buyers and lenders will stay away, fueling even sharper price declines.
During the housing boom, buyers expected prices to rise, so they were quick to buy, borrow and pay a premium. As prices drop, home buyers wait for better deals. says economist Dean Baker of the liberal Center for Economic Policy Research in Washington, D.C.
Lenders want bigger down payments to protect against the falling value of collateral. Homeowners lose equity, so they can't buy other houses. "Price declines can be a self-reinforcing mechanism," Wachter says.
An out-of-control price collapse would have dire consequences, Baker says. Even the most conservative banks would find themselves carrying portfolios of toxic mortgage loans.
If housing prices don't stabilize at traditional levels, financial troubles could spread everywhere — to credit cards, car loans and commercial mortgages, Baker says. "The waves of bad debt will just keep coming," he says.
Baker and Wachter want the U.S. government to take aggressive steps to help homeowners, not just financial institutions. They support expanding programs that restructure troubled mortgages to prevent a flood of foreclosed homes from coming on the market and driving prices below their traditional level.
Rick Wallick is an example of how even cautious borrowers can be hurt by a price collapse. He made a 35% down payment on his house and got a 15-year, fixed-rate mortgage at 5.75%.
Arizona's real estate mess wiped him out anyway. Now that he's in Oregon, he's renting out his Arizona house at a loss and can't afford to keep two homes.
Wallick's Arizona house is surrounded by countless foreclosed homes and empty lots. He told his mortgage company that his December payment will be his last. "It may ruin my credit rating, but I can still buy food," he says.
Shelley McComb used a no-money-down, interest-only ARM to pay $199,000 in December 2006 for a new three-bedroom home near Birmingham, Ala. The house's assessed value briefly rose to $225,000.
Now, she needs to move to Atlanta where her husband got a promotion. The McCombs put their home up for sale in March. After getting no offers, they dropped their price to $179,000. They'd settle for $160,000.
Shelley McComb, 30, who manages a doggie day care center, says, "I wish we'd rented."
Tuesday, October 28, 2008
Case-Shiller Housing Index
New York, October 28, 2008 – Data through August 2008, released today by Standard & Poor’s for its S&P/Case-Shiller1 Home Price Indices, the leading measure of U.S. home prices, shows continued broad based declines in the prices of existing single family homes across the United States, a trend that prevailed throughout the first half of 2008 and has continued into the second half.
Once again, the indices have set new records, with annual declines of 17.7% and 16.6%, respectively. However, the acceleration in decline was only moderate in August. The July data reported annual declines of 17.5% and 16.3%, respectively.
"The downturn in residential real estate prices continued, with very few bright spots in the data," says David M. Blitzer, Chairman of the Index Committee at Standard & Poor’s. "The 10-City Composite and the 20-City Composite reported record 12-month declines. Furthermore, for the fifth (5th) straight month, every region reported negative annual returns. This started when Charlotte, NC, was the last region to turn negative back in April 2008. Both the 10-City and 20-City Composites have been in year-over-year decline for 20 consecutive months. Of the 20 regions, 13 of them had their annual returns worsen from last month’s report. As seen throughout 2008, the Sun Belt markets are being hit the most. Phoenix and Las Vegas are both reporting annual declines in excess of 30%, and Miami, San Francisco, Los Angeles and San Diego are all in excess of 25%."
Nine of the 20 regions have record annual declines. Phoenix and Las Vegas are now returning -30.7% and -30.6% versus August 2007, respectively. Each of the California markets- Los Angeles, San Francisco, and San Diego- are down more than 25% from their values 12 months ago. Miami and Tampa, the two Florida markets, are down 28.1% and 18.1%, respectively.
For the August/July period only 2 regions, Cleveland and Boston, had positive returns. Cleveland returned +1.1% and Boston returned +0.1%. Boston has had positive monthly returns for each of the past five months. Dallas and Denver’s streaks of 4+ straight positive returning months ended in August. San Francisco was the biggest decliner for the month returning -3.5%. This worsened from its July/June return of -1.8%. From August 2007 to August 2008, Dallas and Charlotte have the best relative performance. Dallas is down 2.7% over the year and Charlotte is down 2.8%.
Once again, the indices have set new records, with annual declines of 17.7% and 16.6%, respectively. However, the acceleration in decline was only moderate in August. The July data reported annual declines of 17.5% and 16.3%, respectively.
"The downturn in residential real estate prices continued, with very few bright spots in the data," says David M. Blitzer, Chairman of the Index Committee at Standard & Poor’s. "The 10-City Composite and the 20-City Composite reported record 12-month declines. Furthermore, for the fifth (5th) straight month, every region reported negative annual returns. This started when Charlotte, NC, was the last region to turn negative back in April 2008. Both the 10-City and 20-City Composites have been in year-over-year decline for 20 consecutive months. Of the 20 regions, 13 of them had their annual returns worsen from last month’s report. As seen throughout 2008, the Sun Belt markets are being hit the most. Phoenix and Las Vegas are both reporting annual declines in excess of 30%, and Miami, San Francisco, Los Angeles and San Diego are all in excess of 25%."
Nine of the 20 regions have record annual declines. Phoenix and Las Vegas are now returning -30.7% and -30.6% versus August 2007, respectively. Each of the California markets- Los Angeles, San Francisco, and San Diego- are down more than 25% from their values 12 months ago. Miami and Tampa, the two Florida markets, are down 28.1% and 18.1%, respectively.
For the August/July period only 2 regions, Cleveland and Boston, had positive returns. Cleveland returned +1.1% and Boston returned +0.1%. Boston has had positive monthly returns for each of the past five months. Dallas and Denver’s streaks of 4+ straight positive returning months ended in August. San Francisco was the biggest decliner for the month returning -3.5%. This worsened from its July/June return of -1.8%. From August 2007 to August 2008, Dallas and Charlotte have the best relative performance. Dallas is down 2.7% over the year and Charlotte is down 2.8%.
Wednesday, October 22, 2008
More Problems Ahead For Housing
CAPE CORAL, Florida (Reuters) – Long before she filed for bankruptcy, Ann Neukomm was "under water" -- she owed more on her mortgage than her house was worth -- a situation more and more Americans are finding themselves in.
As the financial crisis hits Main Street America, nearly one in six U.S. homeowners are finding themselves in the same position, threatening the U.S. economy with a new wave of foreclosures and bankruptcies.
About 12 million U.S. homeowners owe more than their homes are worth, compared with 6.6 million at the end of last year and slightly more than 3 million at the close of 2006, said Mark Zandi, chief economist at Moody's Economy.com.
"At the root it's 'the' problem," said Zandi. "If you're going to put your finger on the one thing that's gotten us into this fiasco, it's the fact that millions of homeowners are under water on their homes."
If, like Neukomm, these homeowners go into foreclosure, it would add to the oversupply of homes, delay a recovery in the housing market, and add to pressure on banks.
Already, U.S. consumer spending is slumping as homeowners find they can no longer take equity out of their homes to fund their lifestyles.
In a slowing economy, it doesn't take much to push an underwater mortgage into default.
"When you're under water and you have some kind of hit to your income or some kind of unintended expense, that's when you default. And so now we've got this noxious mix of millions of people under water and quickly rising unemployment," Zandi said.
Like Neukomm, 57, many people got into trouble by refinancing mortgages to pull out cash when rising property values made it seem like an almost risk-free deal.
She ended up filing for bankruptcy in May after failing to keep up with mortgage payments on her home in Cape Coral, a once-booming town in southwest Florida.
"It's a dirty word," said Neukomm of her bankruptcy and personal feelings of failure. "Nobody wants to say it."
WASTELAND
Cape Coral, built over swampland near Fort Myers on Florida's palm-fringed Gulf Coast, was fertile ground for the real estate boom, which peaked across much of the United States three years ago.
It is now a wasteland, with barren strip malls, a bloated inventory of unsold or abandoned homes and ubiquitous for-sale signs that speak volumes about the plunge in housing prices and surge in mortgage defaults that triggered the U.S. credit crunch last year.
With current home prices likely to decline on average by another 10 percent, Zandi said there will be 14.6 million homeowners under water by September next year.
"House prices have collapsed and you've got many homeowners who bought homes in the last three years who put very little down or have been borrowing against their homes," said Zandi. "That's causing this to rise very rapidly."
Economists like Zandi worry that the underlying housing crisis could eventually prove much more costly to the U.S. taxpayer than the $700 billion the U.S. government has pledged to recapitalize banks and buy up distressed debt from financial institutions.
"The government is going to have to start filling this negative equity hole and that's just going to be a direct cost to taxpayers," Zandi said. "This is going to be the really costly part, I think, for taxpayers."
While the U.S. government has focused its rescue on banks, it has done little to help individuals who are struggling to pay their mortgages, apart from the HOPE NOW program, which has facilitated a few hundred thousand mortgage restructurings.
The government may have no option but to step in, especially if a rising tide of foreclosures and falloff in property and other tax revenues endanger municipalities and local governments and force some into bankruptcy.
Both presidential candidates have outlined plans for relief for distressed homeowners but critics say they have been short on details and there appears to be little consensus about how best to help homeowners who are under water.
DREAM HOME
Among homeowners in danger is Virginia Washington, a 64-year-old medical secretary from California who bought her retirement home in the town of Tolleson, Arizona, in 1996.
"It was supposed to be my dream home, but it has turned out to be a nightmare," said Washington, who owes $207,000 on a house that is worth about $150,000.
Whereas many families that are now saddled with negative equity simply hand the keys back to the bank and walk away, Washington is haunted by the fear of losing the $65,000 in savings she put down as her deposit.
"Many people did not put any money down on a home and they feel free to walk away. But $65,000, there's no money tree that grows that kind of money," she said.
In Stockton, California, a town that has become a posterchild of the U.S. housing crisis, Zillow.com said nearly every homeowner who bought in 2006 is now under water.
There are countless other troublespots across the country.
Nationwide, for those who purchased U.S. homes since the beginning of 2003, nearly one in three now have negative equity. Nearly half of buyers who purchased in 2006 are under water.
Despite tighter credit and underwriting for home loans this year, Steve Berg, a managing director at research firm LPS Applied Analytics, said mortgages originated in 2008 were on par or trending worse than those originated last year or in 2006.
"Presumably the equity position of the borrowers in the loans originated this year should be better," Berg said in an interview. "That doesn't appear to be the case, and certainly not to the magnitude you'd expect."
Foreclosed homes already account for 50 percent of all home sales in some markets, according to Zillow.com, an online real estate research service.
For homeowners like Neukomm, any solution to the negative equity problem will be too late. Any day now, she says she expects to receive a letter giving her 21 to 30 days to abandon the house she bought back in 2000.
"I can make my credit card payments. I just can't do it with the house," she said, adding that she was now looking at rental properties in Cape Coral.
(Reporting by Tom Brown; Additional reporting by Tim Gaynor in Phoenix, Julie Haviv in New York and Emily Kaiser in Washington; Editing by Eddie Evans)
As the financial crisis hits Main Street America, nearly one in six U.S. homeowners are finding themselves in the same position, threatening the U.S. economy with a new wave of foreclosures and bankruptcies.
About 12 million U.S. homeowners owe more than their homes are worth, compared with 6.6 million at the end of last year and slightly more than 3 million at the close of 2006, said Mark Zandi, chief economist at Moody's Economy.com.
"At the root it's 'the' problem," said Zandi. "If you're going to put your finger on the one thing that's gotten us into this fiasco, it's the fact that millions of homeowners are under water on their homes."
If, like Neukomm, these homeowners go into foreclosure, it would add to the oversupply of homes, delay a recovery in the housing market, and add to pressure on banks.
Already, U.S. consumer spending is slumping as homeowners find they can no longer take equity out of their homes to fund their lifestyles.
In a slowing economy, it doesn't take much to push an underwater mortgage into default.
"When you're under water and you have some kind of hit to your income or some kind of unintended expense, that's when you default. And so now we've got this noxious mix of millions of people under water and quickly rising unemployment," Zandi said.
Like Neukomm, 57, many people got into trouble by refinancing mortgages to pull out cash when rising property values made it seem like an almost risk-free deal.
She ended up filing for bankruptcy in May after failing to keep up with mortgage payments on her home in Cape Coral, a once-booming town in southwest Florida.
"It's a dirty word," said Neukomm of her bankruptcy and personal feelings of failure. "Nobody wants to say it."
WASTELAND
Cape Coral, built over swampland near Fort Myers on Florida's palm-fringed Gulf Coast, was fertile ground for the real estate boom, which peaked across much of the United States three years ago.
It is now a wasteland, with barren strip malls, a bloated inventory of unsold or abandoned homes and ubiquitous for-sale signs that speak volumes about the plunge in housing prices and surge in mortgage defaults that triggered the U.S. credit crunch last year.
With current home prices likely to decline on average by another 10 percent, Zandi said there will be 14.6 million homeowners under water by September next year.
"House prices have collapsed and you've got many homeowners who bought homes in the last three years who put very little down or have been borrowing against their homes," said Zandi. "That's causing this to rise very rapidly."
Economists like Zandi worry that the underlying housing crisis could eventually prove much more costly to the U.S. taxpayer than the $700 billion the U.S. government has pledged to recapitalize banks and buy up distressed debt from financial institutions.
"The government is going to have to start filling this negative equity hole and that's just going to be a direct cost to taxpayers," Zandi said. "This is going to be the really costly part, I think, for taxpayers."
While the U.S. government has focused its rescue on banks, it has done little to help individuals who are struggling to pay their mortgages, apart from the HOPE NOW program, which has facilitated a few hundred thousand mortgage restructurings.
The government may have no option but to step in, especially if a rising tide of foreclosures and falloff in property and other tax revenues endanger municipalities and local governments and force some into bankruptcy.
Both presidential candidates have outlined plans for relief for distressed homeowners but critics say they have been short on details and there appears to be little consensus about how best to help homeowners who are under water.
DREAM HOME
Among homeowners in danger is Virginia Washington, a 64-year-old medical secretary from California who bought her retirement home in the town of Tolleson, Arizona, in 1996.
"It was supposed to be my dream home, but it has turned out to be a nightmare," said Washington, who owes $207,000 on a house that is worth about $150,000.
Whereas many families that are now saddled with negative equity simply hand the keys back to the bank and walk away, Washington is haunted by the fear of losing the $65,000 in savings she put down as her deposit.
"Many people did not put any money down on a home and they feel free to walk away. But $65,000, there's no money tree that grows that kind of money," she said.
In Stockton, California, a town that has become a posterchild of the U.S. housing crisis, Zillow.com said nearly every homeowner who bought in 2006 is now under water.
There are countless other troublespots across the country.
Nationwide, for those who purchased U.S. homes since the beginning of 2003, nearly one in three now have negative equity. Nearly half of buyers who purchased in 2006 are under water.
Despite tighter credit and underwriting for home loans this year, Steve Berg, a managing director at research firm LPS Applied Analytics, said mortgages originated in 2008 were on par or trending worse than those originated last year or in 2006.
"Presumably the equity position of the borrowers in the loans originated this year should be better," Berg said in an interview. "That doesn't appear to be the case, and certainly not to the magnitude you'd expect."
Foreclosed homes already account for 50 percent of all home sales in some markets, according to Zillow.com, an online real estate research service.
For homeowners like Neukomm, any solution to the negative equity problem will be too late. Any day now, she says she expects to receive a letter giving her 21 to 30 days to abandon the house she bought back in 2000.
"I can make my credit card payments. I just can't do it with the house," she said, adding that she was now looking at rental properties in Cape Coral.
(Reporting by Tom Brown; Additional reporting by Tim Gaynor in Phoenix, Julie Haviv in New York and Emily Kaiser in Washington; Editing by Eddie Evans)
Monday, October 20, 2008
Sunday, October 5, 2008
Fannie Mae NY Times Article, circa 1999 How It All Began
Fannie Mae Eases Credit To Aid Mortgage Lending
By STEVEN A. HOLMES
Published: September 30, 1999
In a move that could help increase home ownership rates among minorities and low-income consumers, the Fannie Mae Corporation is easing the credit requirements on loans that it will purchase from banks and other lenders.
The action, which will begin as a pilot program involving 24 banks in 15 markets -- including the New York metropolitan region -- will encourage those banks to extend home mortgages to individuals whose credit is generally not good enough to qualify for conventional loans. Fannie Mae officials say they hope to make it a nationwide program by next spring.
Fannie Mae, the nation's biggest underwriter of home mortgages, has been under increasing pressure from the Clinton Administration to expand mortgage loans among low and moderate income people and felt pressure from stock holders to maintain its phenomenal growth in profits.
In addition, banks, thrift institutions and mortgage companies have been pressing Fannie Mae to help them make more loans to so-called subprime borrowers. These borrowers whose incomes, credit ratings and savings are not good enough to qualify for conventional loans, can only get loans from finance companies that charge much higher interest rates -- anywhere from three to four percentage points higher than conventional loans.
''Fannie Mae has expanded home ownership for millions of families in the 1990's by reducing down payment requirements,'' said Franklin D. Raines, Fannie Mae's chairman and chief executive officer. ''Yet there remain too many borrowers whose credit is just a notch below what our underwriting has required who have been relegated to paying significantly higher mortgage rates in the so-called subprime market.''
Demographic information on these borrowers is sketchy. But at least one study indicates that 18 percent of the loans in the subprime market went to black borrowers, compared to 5 per cent of loans in the conventional loan market.
In moving, even tentatively, into this new area of lending, Fannie Mae is taking on significantly more risk, which may not pose any difficulties during flush economic times. But the government-subsidized corporation may run into trouble in an economic downturn, prompting a government rescue similar to that of the savings and loan industry in the 1980's.
''From the perspective of many people, including me, this is another thrift industry growing up around us,'' said Peter Wallison a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. ''If they fail, the government will have to step up and bail them out the way it stepped up and bailed out the thrift industry.''
Under Fannie Mae's pilot program, consumers who qualify can secure a mortgage with an interest rate one percentage point above that of a conventional, 30-year fixed rate mortgage of less than $240,000 -- a rate that currently averages about 7.76 per cent. If the borrower makes his or her monthly payments on time for two years, the one percentage point premium is dropped.
Fannie Mae, the nation's biggest underwriter of home mortgages, does not lend money directly to consumers. Instead, it purchases loans that banks make on what is called the secondary market. By expanding the type of loans that it will buy, Fannie Mae is hoping to spur banks to make more loans to people with less-than-stellar credit ratings.
Fannie Mae officials stress that the new mortgages will be extended to all potential borrowers who can qualify for a mortgage. But they add that the move is intended in part to increase the number of minority and low income home owners who tend to have worse credit ratings than non-Hispanic whites.
Home ownership has, in fact, exploded among minorities during the economic boom of the 1990's. The number of mortgages extended to Hispanic applicants jumped by 87.2 per cent from 1993 to 1998, according to Harvard University's Joint Center for Housing Studies. During that same period the number of African Americans who got mortgages to buy a home increased by 71.9 per cent and the number of Asian Americans by 46.3 per cent.
In contrast, the number of non-Hispanic whites who received loans for homes increased by 31.2 per cent.
Despite these gains, home ownership rates for minorities continue to lag behind non-Hispanic whites, in part because blacks and Hispanics in particular tend to have on average worse credit ratings.
In July, the Department of Housing and Urban Development proposed that by the year 2001, 50 percent of Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's portfolio be made up of loans to low and moderate-income borrowers. Last year, 44 percent of the loans Fannie Mae purchased were from these groups.
The change in policy also comes at the same time that HUD is investigating allegations of racial discrimination in the automated underwriting systems used by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to determine the credit-worthiness of credit applicants.
By STEVEN A. HOLMES
Published: September 30, 1999
In a move that could help increase home ownership rates among minorities and low-income consumers, the Fannie Mae Corporation is easing the credit requirements on loans that it will purchase from banks and other lenders.
The action, which will begin as a pilot program involving 24 banks in 15 markets -- including the New York metropolitan region -- will encourage those banks to extend home mortgages to individuals whose credit is generally not good enough to qualify for conventional loans. Fannie Mae officials say they hope to make it a nationwide program by next spring.
Fannie Mae, the nation's biggest underwriter of home mortgages, has been under increasing pressure from the Clinton Administration to expand mortgage loans among low and moderate income people and felt pressure from stock holders to maintain its phenomenal growth in profits.
In addition, banks, thrift institutions and mortgage companies have been pressing Fannie Mae to help them make more loans to so-called subprime borrowers. These borrowers whose incomes, credit ratings and savings are not good enough to qualify for conventional loans, can only get loans from finance companies that charge much higher interest rates -- anywhere from three to four percentage points higher than conventional loans.
''Fannie Mae has expanded home ownership for millions of families in the 1990's by reducing down payment requirements,'' said Franklin D. Raines, Fannie Mae's chairman and chief executive officer. ''Yet there remain too many borrowers whose credit is just a notch below what our underwriting has required who have been relegated to paying significantly higher mortgage rates in the so-called subprime market.''
Demographic information on these borrowers is sketchy. But at least one study indicates that 18 percent of the loans in the subprime market went to black borrowers, compared to 5 per cent of loans in the conventional loan market.
In moving, even tentatively, into this new area of lending, Fannie Mae is taking on significantly more risk, which may not pose any difficulties during flush economic times. But the government-subsidized corporation may run into trouble in an economic downturn, prompting a government rescue similar to that of the savings and loan industry in the 1980's.
''From the perspective of many people, including me, this is another thrift industry growing up around us,'' said Peter Wallison a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. ''If they fail, the government will have to step up and bail them out the way it stepped up and bailed out the thrift industry.''
Under Fannie Mae's pilot program, consumers who qualify can secure a mortgage with an interest rate one percentage point above that of a conventional, 30-year fixed rate mortgage of less than $240,000 -- a rate that currently averages about 7.76 per cent. If the borrower makes his or her monthly payments on time for two years, the one percentage point premium is dropped.
Fannie Mae, the nation's biggest underwriter of home mortgages, does not lend money directly to consumers. Instead, it purchases loans that banks make on what is called the secondary market. By expanding the type of loans that it will buy, Fannie Mae is hoping to spur banks to make more loans to people with less-than-stellar credit ratings.
Fannie Mae officials stress that the new mortgages will be extended to all potential borrowers who can qualify for a mortgage. But they add that the move is intended in part to increase the number of minority and low income home owners who tend to have worse credit ratings than non-Hispanic whites.
Home ownership has, in fact, exploded among minorities during the economic boom of the 1990's. The number of mortgages extended to Hispanic applicants jumped by 87.2 per cent from 1993 to 1998, according to Harvard University's Joint Center for Housing Studies. During that same period the number of African Americans who got mortgages to buy a home increased by 71.9 per cent and the number of Asian Americans by 46.3 per cent.
In contrast, the number of non-Hispanic whites who received loans for homes increased by 31.2 per cent.
Despite these gains, home ownership rates for minorities continue to lag behind non-Hispanic whites, in part because blacks and Hispanics in particular tend to have on average worse credit ratings.
In July, the Department of Housing and Urban Development proposed that by the year 2001, 50 percent of Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's portfolio be made up of loans to low and moderate-income borrowers. Last year, 44 percent of the loans Fannie Mae purchased were from these groups.
The change in policy also comes at the same time that HUD is investigating allegations of racial discrimination in the automated underwriting systems used by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to determine the credit-worthiness of credit applicants.
Friday, October 3, 2008
Citi Left At The Altar - Wells Fargo Buys Wachovia
SAN FRANCISCO and CHARLOTTE, October 3, 2008 – Wells Fargo & Company
(NYSE:WFC) and Wachovia Corporation (NYSE:WB) said today they have signed a
definitive agreement for the merger of the two companies including all of Wachovia’s
banking operations in a whole company transaction requiring no financial assistance
from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) or any other government
agency.
Under the agreement, Wells Fargo will acquire all outstanding shares of common stock
of Wachovia in a stock-for-stock transaction. In the transaction, Wells Fargo will
acquire all of Wachovia Corporation and all its businesses and obligations, including its
preferred equity and indebtedness, and all its banking deposits.
Under terms of the agreement, which has been approved unanimously by the boards of
both companies, Wachovia shareholders will receive 0.1991 shares of Wells Fargo
common stock in exchange for each share of Wachovia common stock. The transaction,
based on Wells Fargo’s closing stock price of $35.16 on October 2, 2008, is valued at
$7.00 per Wachovia common share for a total transaction value of approximately $15.1
billion. Wachovia has almost 2.2 billion common shares outstanding. The agreement
requires the approval of Wachovia shareholders and customary approvals of regulators.
Wells Fargo will record Wachovia’s credit-impaired assets at fair value. The acquisition
is expected to exceed Wells Fargo’s internal rate of return goal and add to Wells Fargo’s
earnings per share in the first year of operations, excluding integration costs, writedowns,
transaction charges, and credit reserve build. Wells Fargo expects to incur
merger and integration charges of approximately $10 billion. To maintain its strong
capital position, Wells Fargo intends to issue up to $20 billion of new Wells Fargo
securities, primarily common stock.
“We at Wachovia have great admiration and respect for the people and businesses at
Wells Fargo and we are extremely pleased to join forces with this outstanding
company,” said Robert K. Steel, President and CEO of Wachovia Corp. “Today’s
announcement creates one of the strongest financial firms in the world and is great for
all Wachovia constituencies: our shareholders, customers, colleagues and communities.
This deal enables us to keep Wachovia intact and preserve the value of an integrated
company, without government support. The market presence and composition of our
businesses, along with our service-oriented cultures, are extraordinarily complementary
and this combination creates great potential for sustained stability and growth.”
“This agreement represents a compelling value for Wachovia shareholders,” said Wells
Fargo Chairman Dick Kovacevich. “It provides superior value compared to the
previous offer to acquire only the banking operations of the company and because
Wachovia shareholders will have a meaningful opportunity to participate in the growth
and success of a combined Wachovia-Wells Fargo that will be one of the world’s great
financial services companies. We are combining the industry’s number one ranking
customer service culture of Wachovia with the industry’s number one sales and crossselling
culture of Wells Fargo. The best in service and the best in sales, an unbeatable
combination. Wachovia shareholders also will benefit from holding the stock of a
strong financial institution, the U.S. bank with the highest credit ratings and with a long
history of increasing dividends on its common stock. Wachovia’s brokerage and asset
management businesses, which would have been left behind in the prior proposal, are
tightly interwoven with Wachovia’s core banking business – and this agreement avoids
the complexity and unavoidable loss of value in trying to separate them, which would
have disrupted Wachovia’s team members and customers. We also bring to this merger
agreement our 157 years of experience in financial services and the unparalleled
convenience we can offer Wachovia customers through one of the most extensive
financial services distributions systems in North America. We have the highest regard
for the quality and commitment and caring of Wachovia team members. We believe
their demonstrated commitment to outstanding customer service and their highest
standards of community leadership are identical to our own values. And, of course,
this agreement won’t require even a penny from the FDIC.”
(NYSE:WFC) and Wachovia Corporation (NYSE:WB) said today they have signed a
definitive agreement for the merger of the two companies including all of Wachovia’s
banking operations in a whole company transaction requiring no financial assistance
from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) or any other government
agency.
Under the agreement, Wells Fargo will acquire all outstanding shares of common stock
of Wachovia in a stock-for-stock transaction. In the transaction, Wells Fargo will
acquire all of Wachovia Corporation and all its businesses and obligations, including its
preferred equity and indebtedness, and all its banking deposits.
Under terms of the agreement, which has been approved unanimously by the boards of
both companies, Wachovia shareholders will receive 0.1991 shares of Wells Fargo
common stock in exchange for each share of Wachovia common stock. The transaction,
based on Wells Fargo’s closing stock price of $35.16 on October 2, 2008, is valued at
$7.00 per Wachovia common share for a total transaction value of approximately $15.1
billion. Wachovia has almost 2.2 billion common shares outstanding. The agreement
requires the approval of Wachovia shareholders and customary approvals of regulators.
Wells Fargo will record Wachovia’s credit-impaired assets at fair value. The acquisition
is expected to exceed Wells Fargo’s internal rate of return goal and add to Wells Fargo’s
earnings per share in the first year of operations, excluding integration costs, writedowns,
transaction charges, and credit reserve build. Wells Fargo expects to incur
merger and integration charges of approximately $10 billion. To maintain its strong
capital position, Wells Fargo intends to issue up to $20 billion of new Wells Fargo
securities, primarily common stock.
“We at Wachovia have great admiration and respect for the people and businesses at
Wells Fargo and we are extremely pleased to join forces with this outstanding
company,” said Robert K. Steel, President and CEO of Wachovia Corp. “Today’s
announcement creates one of the strongest financial firms in the world and is great for
all Wachovia constituencies: our shareholders, customers, colleagues and communities.
This deal enables us to keep Wachovia intact and preserve the value of an integrated
company, without government support. The market presence and composition of our
businesses, along with our service-oriented cultures, are extraordinarily complementary
and this combination creates great potential for sustained stability and growth.”
“This agreement represents a compelling value for Wachovia shareholders,” said Wells
Fargo Chairman Dick Kovacevich. “It provides superior value compared to the
previous offer to acquire only the banking operations of the company and because
Wachovia shareholders will have a meaningful opportunity to participate in the growth
and success of a combined Wachovia-Wells Fargo that will be one of the world’s great
financial services companies. We are combining the industry’s number one ranking
customer service culture of Wachovia with the industry’s number one sales and crossselling
culture of Wells Fargo. The best in service and the best in sales, an unbeatable
combination. Wachovia shareholders also will benefit from holding the stock of a
strong financial institution, the U.S. bank with the highest credit ratings and with a long
history of increasing dividends on its common stock. Wachovia’s brokerage and asset
management businesses, which would have been left behind in the prior proposal, are
tightly interwoven with Wachovia’s core banking business – and this agreement avoids
the complexity and unavoidable loss of value in trying to separate them, which would
have disrupted Wachovia’s team members and customers. We also bring to this merger
agreement our 157 years of experience in financial services and the unparalleled
convenience we can offer Wachovia customers through one of the most extensive
financial services distributions systems in North America. We have the highest regard
for the quality and commitment and caring of Wachovia team members. We believe
their demonstrated commitment to outstanding customer service and their highest
standards of community leadership are identical to our own values. And, of course,
this agreement won’t require even a penny from the FDIC.”
Thursday, October 2, 2008
Community Re-investment Act
The Government-Created Subprime Mortgage Meltdown
by Thomas J. DiLorenzo
The thousands of mortgage defaults and foreclosures in the "subprime" housing market (i.e., mortgage holders with poor credit ratings) is the direct result of thirty years of government policy that has forced banks to make bad loans to un-creditworthy borrowers. The policy in question is the 1977 Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), which compels banks to make loans to low-income borrowers and in what the supporters of the Act call "communities of color" that they might not otherwise make based on purely economic criteria.
The original lobbyists for the CRA were the hardcore leftists who supported the Carter administration and were often rewarded for their support with government grants and programs like the CRA that they benefited from. These included various "neighborhood organizations," as they like to call themselves, such as "ACORN" (Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now). These organizations claim that over $1 trillion in CRA loans have been made, although no one seems to know the magnitude with much certainty. A U.S. Senate Banking Committee staffer told me about ten years ago that at least $100 billion in such loans had been made in the first twenty years of the Act.
So-called "community groups" like ACORN benefit themselves from the CRA through a process that sounds like legalized extortion. The CRA is enforced by four federal government bureaucracies: the Fed, the Comptroller of the Currency, the Office of Thrift Supervision, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. The law is set up so that any bank merger, branch expansion, or new branch creation can be postponed or prohibited by any of these four bureaucracies if a CRA "protest" is issued by a "community group." This can cost banks great sums of money, and the "community groups" understand this perfectly well. It is their leverage. They use this leverage to get the banks to give them millions of dollars as well as promising to make a certain amount of bad loans in their communities.
A man named Bruce Marks became quite notorious during the last decade for pressuring banks to earmark literally billions of dollars to his organization, the "Neighborhood Assistance Corporation of America." He once boasted to the New York Times that he had "won" loan commitments totaling $3.8 billion from Bank of America, First Union Corporation, and the Fleet Financial Group. And that is just one "community group" operating in one city – Boston.
Banks have been placed in a Catch 22 situation by the CRA: If they comply, they know they will have to suffer from more loan defaults. If they don’t comply, they face financial penalties and, worse yet, their business plans for mergers, branch expansions, etc. can be blocked by CRA protesters, which can cost a large corporation like Bank of America billions of dollars. Like most businesses, they have largely buckled under and have surrendered to their bureaucratic masters.
Consequently, banks in every community in America have been forced to hold a portfolio of bad loans, euphemistically referred to as "subprime" loans. In order to compensate themselves for the added risk of extending these loans, many lenders have increased the lending fees associated with mortgage loans. This is simply an indirect way of doing what banks always do – and what they must do to remain solvent: charging effectively higher rates of interest on riskier loans.
But this is discriminatory!, complained the "community organizations." Thus, if one browses the ACORN web site, one can read of their boasts of having "predatory lending laws" passed in numerous states which outlaw such fees, prohibiting banks from protecting themselves from the added risk involved in making forced loans to "subprime" borrowers.
These are price control laws, and price controls always cause shortages. Normally, banks would respond to such laws by extending fewer riskier loans. But in this case the banks are forced to continue making the marginal loans by their bureaucratic masters at the Fed and the other three federal bureaucracies mentioned above. So-called predatory lending laws therefore force the banks to "eat" the losses. This is undoubtedly a contributing factor to the bankruptcy of dozens of mortgage lenders over the past year.
Then of course there is the issue of the Fed’s monetary policy having created the housing bubble, characterized by a spectacular escalation of real estate values in every American city over the past decade or so. This created a further problem for the financial institutions that are victimized by the CRA. They are forced to make a certain amount of bad loans, but because of the Fed-created explosion in housing prices, many thousands of subprime borrowers no longer qualified, by a long stretch, for conventional mortgages based on their incomes.
The only way these borrowers could qualify for their mortgage loans (even ignoring their bad credit ratings) was to take out adjustable rate mortgages, some of which had astonishingly low first-year rates in the 3 percent range, and sometimes lower. This is what has largely fueled the subprime mortgage meltdown – the inability of thousands of subprime borrowers to afford their mortgages now that their rates have adjusted upward. Thus, the combination of the Fed’s enforcement of the CRA (with the help of political pressure groups like ACORN) and its post 9/11 monetary policy in general are the reasons for the bursting real estate bubble and the "subprime" mortgage meltdown.
Don’t expect to read about this in the "mainstream media," however, which generally views groups like ACORN as heroic champions of the poor, laws like the CRA as anti-discrimination laws, and places all of the blame for the subprime mortgage meltdown on greedy capitalists, especially mortgage brokers. Encouraged by such reporting, the odious Senator Charles Schumer of New York has promised federal legislation that will reign in these miscreants, while the Bush administration is proposing an indirect bank bailout by having the Federal Housing Administration cover many of the bad "subprime" loans. This will create what economists call a "moral hazard" by encouraging even more bad loans to be extended in the future. Every banker in America will be glad to extend loans (at high rates of interest) to the most uncreditworthy borrowers if he thinks there is no possibility of default with the FHA effectively guaranteeing the loan.
by Thomas J. DiLorenzo
The thousands of mortgage defaults and foreclosures in the "subprime" housing market (i.e., mortgage holders with poor credit ratings) is the direct result of thirty years of government policy that has forced banks to make bad loans to un-creditworthy borrowers. The policy in question is the 1977 Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), which compels banks to make loans to low-income borrowers and in what the supporters of the Act call "communities of color" that they might not otherwise make based on purely economic criteria.
The original lobbyists for the CRA were the hardcore leftists who supported the Carter administration and were often rewarded for their support with government grants and programs like the CRA that they benefited from. These included various "neighborhood organizations," as they like to call themselves, such as "ACORN" (Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now). These organizations claim that over $1 trillion in CRA loans have been made, although no one seems to know the magnitude with much certainty. A U.S. Senate Banking Committee staffer told me about ten years ago that at least $100 billion in such loans had been made in the first twenty years of the Act.
So-called "community groups" like ACORN benefit themselves from the CRA through a process that sounds like legalized extortion. The CRA is enforced by four federal government bureaucracies: the Fed, the Comptroller of the Currency, the Office of Thrift Supervision, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. The law is set up so that any bank merger, branch expansion, or new branch creation can be postponed or prohibited by any of these four bureaucracies if a CRA "protest" is issued by a "community group." This can cost banks great sums of money, and the "community groups" understand this perfectly well. It is their leverage. They use this leverage to get the banks to give them millions of dollars as well as promising to make a certain amount of bad loans in their communities.
A man named Bruce Marks became quite notorious during the last decade for pressuring banks to earmark literally billions of dollars to his organization, the "Neighborhood Assistance Corporation of America." He once boasted to the New York Times that he had "won" loan commitments totaling $3.8 billion from Bank of America, First Union Corporation, and the Fleet Financial Group. And that is just one "community group" operating in one city – Boston.
Banks have been placed in a Catch 22 situation by the CRA: If they comply, they know they will have to suffer from more loan defaults. If they don’t comply, they face financial penalties and, worse yet, their business plans for mergers, branch expansions, etc. can be blocked by CRA protesters, which can cost a large corporation like Bank of America billions of dollars. Like most businesses, they have largely buckled under and have surrendered to their bureaucratic masters.
Consequently, banks in every community in America have been forced to hold a portfolio of bad loans, euphemistically referred to as "subprime" loans. In order to compensate themselves for the added risk of extending these loans, many lenders have increased the lending fees associated with mortgage loans. This is simply an indirect way of doing what banks always do – and what they must do to remain solvent: charging effectively higher rates of interest on riskier loans.
But this is discriminatory!, complained the "community organizations." Thus, if one browses the ACORN web site, one can read of their boasts of having "predatory lending laws" passed in numerous states which outlaw such fees, prohibiting banks from protecting themselves from the added risk involved in making forced loans to "subprime" borrowers.
These are price control laws, and price controls always cause shortages. Normally, banks would respond to such laws by extending fewer riskier loans. But in this case the banks are forced to continue making the marginal loans by their bureaucratic masters at the Fed and the other three federal bureaucracies mentioned above. So-called predatory lending laws therefore force the banks to "eat" the losses. This is undoubtedly a contributing factor to the bankruptcy of dozens of mortgage lenders over the past year.
Then of course there is the issue of the Fed’s monetary policy having created the housing bubble, characterized by a spectacular escalation of real estate values in every American city over the past decade or so. This created a further problem for the financial institutions that are victimized by the CRA. They are forced to make a certain amount of bad loans, but because of the Fed-created explosion in housing prices, many thousands of subprime borrowers no longer qualified, by a long stretch, for conventional mortgages based on their incomes.
The only way these borrowers could qualify for their mortgage loans (even ignoring their bad credit ratings) was to take out adjustable rate mortgages, some of which had astonishingly low first-year rates in the 3 percent range, and sometimes lower. This is what has largely fueled the subprime mortgage meltdown – the inability of thousands of subprime borrowers to afford their mortgages now that their rates have adjusted upward. Thus, the combination of the Fed’s enforcement of the CRA (with the help of political pressure groups like ACORN) and its post 9/11 monetary policy in general are the reasons for the bursting real estate bubble and the "subprime" mortgage meltdown.
Don’t expect to read about this in the "mainstream media," however, which generally views groups like ACORN as heroic champions of the poor, laws like the CRA as anti-discrimination laws, and places all of the blame for the subprime mortgage meltdown on greedy capitalists, especially mortgage brokers. Encouraged by such reporting, the odious Senator Charles Schumer of New York has promised federal legislation that will reign in these miscreants, while the Bush administration is proposing an indirect bank bailout by having the Federal Housing Administration cover many of the bad "subprime" loans. This will create what economists call a "moral hazard" by encouraging even more bad loans to be extended in the future. Every banker in America will be glad to extend loans (at high rates of interest) to the most uncreditworthy borrowers if he thinks there is no possibility of default with the FHA effectively guaranteeing the loan.
Wednesday, October 1, 2008
Why The Bailout Failure Was Good
Lombard Street Research (London)
U.S. CONGRESS STRUCK A BLOW FOR FREEDOM yesterday, giving the lie to its critics on Wall Street and the administration, who have shown a far weaker grasp of principle.
My colleague Brian Reading argued for a buyout rather than a bailout a few days ago, and that seems to be what is happening. The disposal of problems by existing well-tried systems is adequate to the situation, e.g., the U.S. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. with Citigroup (ticker: C)/ Wachovia (WB) and JPMorgan Chase (JPM)/ Washington Mutual (WM).
The Irish addressed the true issue directly by simply guaranteeing all deposits. Let the shares do what they want.
No more loans? Oh dear! Maybe, in a crisis caused by grossly excessive private-sector debt loads, that is exactly what is needed. It reminds one of our own Tony Blair blathering on about the need for new laws to curb terrorism, while his then Chancellor, Gordon Brown, was busily restraining funds for the police and the Courts.
We do not need headline-grabbing initiatives, we need good administration. Per my note yesterday, the U.S. banking system is mostly not broke -- it can be fixed without too much drama. Other countries are only marginally involved.
This last point was highlighted by Hong Kong today. The Hang Seng opened down 5.5% and ended up on the day. Sometime during the day investors woke up. In London, the FTSE-100 opened down 3% and was then up, now down a touch. Yet Britain is certainly closer to the eye of the storm than Hong Kong. Why are they not tanking? Because they are cheap, that's why! The S&P is (oddly) still quite pricey, on a trailing, special-charges-adjusted price/earnings multiple of over 13 times. The Hang Seng is at 11 times, the FTSE and the main Economic and Monetary Union indices at under nine times.
Huge problems are already overdiscounted, including the fact that Americans will not only not be borrowing for a while, but actually spending less than their income. It's called saving. Maybe we will have a recession. Nobody has actually forecast one any worse than 1990's -- compared to 1980-1982 or 1974-1975 this is minor, as is the market disruption. And comparisons with the 1930s are ridiculous.
It is true that Messrs. [Treasury Secretary Henry] Paulson and [Federal Reserve Chairman Ben] Bernanke are part of the problem, with their gross neglect of contingency planning followed by attempted blackmail of the Congress. But even if they have not (yet) done the decent thing and resigned, stocks are probably close to the bottom of this downcycle.
-- Charles Dumas
U.S. CONGRESS STRUCK A BLOW FOR FREEDOM yesterday, giving the lie to its critics on Wall Street and the administration, who have shown a far weaker grasp of principle.
My colleague Brian Reading argued for a buyout rather than a bailout a few days ago, and that seems to be what is happening. The disposal of problems by existing well-tried systems is adequate to the situation, e.g., the U.S. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. with Citigroup (ticker: C)/ Wachovia (WB) and JPMorgan Chase (JPM)/ Washington Mutual (WM).
The Irish addressed the true issue directly by simply guaranteeing all deposits. Let the shares do what they want.
No more loans? Oh dear! Maybe, in a crisis caused by grossly excessive private-sector debt loads, that is exactly what is needed. It reminds one of our own Tony Blair blathering on about the need for new laws to curb terrorism, while his then Chancellor, Gordon Brown, was busily restraining funds for the police and the Courts.
We do not need headline-grabbing initiatives, we need good administration. Per my note yesterday, the U.S. banking system is mostly not broke -- it can be fixed without too much drama. Other countries are only marginally involved.
This last point was highlighted by Hong Kong today. The Hang Seng opened down 5.5% and ended up on the day. Sometime during the day investors woke up. In London, the FTSE-100 opened down 3% and was then up, now down a touch. Yet Britain is certainly closer to the eye of the storm than Hong Kong. Why are they not tanking? Because they are cheap, that's why! The S&P is (oddly) still quite pricey, on a trailing, special-charges-adjusted price/earnings multiple of over 13 times. The Hang Seng is at 11 times, the FTSE and the main Economic and Monetary Union indices at under nine times.
Huge problems are already overdiscounted, including the fact that Americans will not only not be borrowing for a while, but actually spending less than their income. It's called saving. Maybe we will have a recession. Nobody has actually forecast one any worse than 1990's -- compared to 1980-1982 or 1974-1975 this is minor, as is the market disruption. And comparisons with the 1930s are ridiculous.
It is true that Messrs. [Treasury Secretary Henry] Paulson and [Federal Reserve Chairman Ben] Bernanke are part of the problem, with their gross neglect of contingency planning followed by attempted blackmail of the Congress. But even if they have not (yet) done the decent thing and resigned, stocks are probably close to the bottom of this downcycle.
-- Charles Dumas
Wednesday, September 24, 2008
More From Bill Gross
How Main Street Will Profit
Capitalism is a delicate balance between production and finance. Today, our seemingly guaranteed living standard is threatened, much like it has been in previous recessions or, some would say, the Depression. Finance has run amok because of oversecuritization, poor regulation and the excessively exuberant spirits of investors; the delicate balance has once again been disrupted; production, and with it jobs and our national standard of living, is declining.
If this were a textbook recession, policy prescriptions would recommend two aspirin and bed rest -- a healthy dose of interest rate cuts and a fiscal package that mildly expanded the deficit. That, of course, has been the attempted remedy over the past 12 months. But recent events have made it apparent that this downturn differs from recessions past. Today's housing bubble, unlike that of the stock market's before it, was financed with excessive and poorly regulated mortgage debt, and as housing prices began to tumble from the peak, the delinquencies and foreclosures have led to a downward spiral of debt liquidation that in turn led to even lower prices and more foreclosures.
And so, instead of mild medication and rest, it became apparent that quadruple bypass surgery is necessary. The extreme measures are extended government guarantees and the formation of an RTC-like holding company housed within the Treasury. Critics call this a bailout of Wall Street; in fact, it is anything but. I estimate the average price of distressed mortgages that pass from "troubled financial institutions" to the Treasury at auction will be 65 cents on the dollar, representing a loss of one-third of the original purchase price to the seller, and a prospective yield of 10 to 15 percent to the Treasury. Financed at 3 to 4 percent via the sale of Treasury bonds, the Treasury will therefore be in a position to earn a positive carry or yield spread of at least 7 to 8 percent. Calls for appropriate oversight of this auction process are more than justified. There are disinterested firms, some not even based on Wall Street, with the expertise to evaluate these complicated pools of mortgages and other assets to assure taxpayers that their money is being wisely invested. My estimate of double-digit returns assumes lengthy ownership of the assets and is in turn dependent on the level of home foreclosures, but this program is, in fact, directed to prevent just that.
In effect, the Treasury will have the fate of the American taxpayer in its hands. The Resolution Trust Corp., created in the late 1980s to deal with the savings and loan crisis, dealt with previously purchased real estate, which was flushed into government hands with a "best efforts" future liquidation. Today, the purchase of junk mortgages, securitized credit card receivables and even student loans will be bought at prices significantly below "par" or cost, and prospectively at levels allowing for capital gains. This is a Wall Street-friendly package only to the extent that it frees up funds for future loans and economic growth. Politicians afraid of parallels to legislation that enabled the Iraq war are raising concerns about a rush to judgment, but the need for speed is clear. In this case, there really are weapons of mass destruction -- financial derivatives -- that threaten to destroy our system from within. Move quickly, Washington, with appropriate safeguards.
The Treasury proposal will not be a bailout of Wall Street but a rescue of Main Street, as lending capacity and confidence is restored to our banks and the delicate balance between production and finance is given a chance to work its magic. Democratic Party earmarks mandating forbearance on home mortgage foreclosures will be critical as well. If this program is successful, however, it is obvious that the free market and Wild West capitalism of recent decades will be forever changed. Future economic textbooks are likely to teach that while capitalism is the most dynamic and productive system ever conceived, it is most efficient over the long term when there is another delicate balance -- between private incentive and government oversight.
The writer is chief investment officer and founder of the investment management firm PIMCO.
Capitalism is a delicate balance between production and finance. Today, our seemingly guaranteed living standard is threatened, much like it has been in previous recessions or, some would say, the Depression. Finance has run amok because of oversecuritization, poor regulation and the excessively exuberant spirits of investors; the delicate balance has once again been disrupted; production, and with it jobs and our national standard of living, is declining.
If this were a textbook recession, policy prescriptions would recommend two aspirin and bed rest -- a healthy dose of interest rate cuts and a fiscal package that mildly expanded the deficit. That, of course, has been the attempted remedy over the past 12 months. But recent events have made it apparent that this downturn differs from recessions past. Today's housing bubble, unlike that of the stock market's before it, was financed with excessive and poorly regulated mortgage debt, and as housing prices began to tumble from the peak, the delinquencies and foreclosures have led to a downward spiral of debt liquidation that in turn led to even lower prices and more foreclosures.
And so, instead of mild medication and rest, it became apparent that quadruple bypass surgery is necessary. The extreme measures are extended government guarantees and the formation of an RTC-like holding company housed within the Treasury. Critics call this a bailout of Wall Street; in fact, it is anything but. I estimate the average price of distressed mortgages that pass from "troubled financial institutions" to the Treasury at auction will be 65 cents on the dollar, representing a loss of one-third of the original purchase price to the seller, and a prospective yield of 10 to 15 percent to the Treasury. Financed at 3 to 4 percent via the sale of Treasury bonds, the Treasury will therefore be in a position to earn a positive carry or yield spread of at least 7 to 8 percent. Calls for appropriate oversight of this auction process are more than justified. There are disinterested firms, some not even based on Wall Street, with the expertise to evaluate these complicated pools of mortgages and other assets to assure taxpayers that their money is being wisely invested. My estimate of double-digit returns assumes lengthy ownership of the assets and is in turn dependent on the level of home foreclosures, but this program is, in fact, directed to prevent just that.
In effect, the Treasury will have the fate of the American taxpayer in its hands. The Resolution Trust Corp., created in the late 1980s to deal with the savings and loan crisis, dealt with previously purchased real estate, which was flushed into government hands with a "best efforts" future liquidation. Today, the purchase of junk mortgages, securitized credit card receivables and even student loans will be bought at prices significantly below "par" or cost, and prospectively at levels allowing for capital gains. This is a Wall Street-friendly package only to the extent that it frees up funds for future loans and economic growth. Politicians afraid of parallels to legislation that enabled the Iraq war are raising concerns about a rush to judgment, but the need for speed is clear. In this case, there really are weapons of mass destruction -- financial derivatives -- that threaten to destroy our system from within. Move quickly, Washington, with appropriate safeguards.
The Treasury proposal will not be a bailout of Wall Street but a rescue of Main Street, as lending capacity and confidence is restored to our banks and the delicate balance between production and finance is given a chance to work its magic. Democratic Party earmarks mandating forbearance on home mortgage foreclosures will be critical as well. If this program is successful, however, it is obvious that the free market and Wild West capitalism of recent decades will be forever changed. Future economic textbooks are likely to teach that while capitalism is the most dynamic and productive system ever conceived, it is most efficient over the long term when there is another delicate balance -- between private incentive and government oversight.
The writer is chief investment officer and founder of the investment management firm PIMCO.
Bill Gross On The Bailout
NEW YORK - The Treasury's proposed $700 billion bailout for financial firms could yield a profit of at least 7 percent to 8 percent and benefit taxpayers, Bill Gross, who manages the world's biggest bond fund, wrote in an opinion piece in The Washington Post on Wednesday.
Gross, the chief investment officer of Pacific Investment Management Co., or Pimco, estimates the average price of distressed mortgages that pass from "troubled financial institutions" to the Treasury at auction will be 65 cents on the dollar. That will represent a loss of one-third of the original purchase price to the seller, and a prospective yield of 10 percent to 15 percent to the Treasury, Gross said.
"Financed at 3 percent to 4 percent via the sale of Treasury bonds, the Treasury will therefore be in a position to earn a positive carry or yield spread of at least 7 percent to 8 percent," Gross argued. "The Treasury proposal will not be a bailout of Wall Street but a rescue of Main Street, as lending capacity and confidence is restored to our banks and the delicate balance between production and finance is given a chance to work its magic," Gross added.
The last few weeks have been marked by the U.S. takeovers of mortgage companies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac the government bailout of insurer American International Group Inc, the bankruptcy filing of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc , and the pending sale of Merrill Lynch & Co Inc to Bank of America Corp .
U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke are pushing Congress to approve a taxpayer-funded plan, estimated at roughly $700 billion, that would let the government buy illiquid assets from lenders.
Gross' estimate of double-digit returns in scooped up mortgage securities assumes lengthy ownership of the assets and is in turn dependent on the level of home foreclosures, "but the Treasury's program is, in fact, directed to prevent just that," he added. Gross manages the $133 billion Pimco Total Return Fund and helps oversee the more than $812 billion in assets at Pimco.
Gross, the chief investment officer of Pacific Investment Management Co., or Pimco, estimates the average price of distressed mortgages that pass from "troubled financial institutions" to the Treasury at auction will be 65 cents on the dollar. That will represent a loss of one-third of the original purchase price to the seller, and a prospective yield of 10 percent to 15 percent to the Treasury, Gross said.
"Financed at 3 percent to 4 percent via the sale of Treasury bonds, the Treasury will therefore be in a position to earn a positive carry or yield spread of at least 7 percent to 8 percent," Gross argued. "The Treasury proposal will not be a bailout of Wall Street but a rescue of Main Street, as lending capacity and confidence is restored to our banks and the delicate balance between production and finance is given a chance to work its magic," Gross added.
The last few weeks have been marked by the U.S. takeovers of mortgage companies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac the government bailout of insurer American International Group Inc
U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke are pushing Congress to approve a taxpayer-funded plan, estimated at roughly $700 billion, that would let the government buy illiquid assets from lenders.
Gross' estimate of double-digit returns in scooped up mortgage securities assumes lengthy ownership of the assets and is in turn dependent on the level of home foreclosures, "but the Treasury's program is, in fact, directed to prevent just that," he added. Gross manages the $133 billion Pimco Total Return Fund and helps oversee the more than $812 billion in assets at Pimco.
August 2008 Existing Home Sales
Released on 9/24/2008 10:00:00 AM For August, 2008
Existing Home Sales - Level - SAAR---Previous---Consensus---Consensus Range---Actual
-------------------------------------5.00 M-----4.92M-------4.80M to 5.15M----4.91M
Existing Home Sales - M/M Change----3.1%-------------------------------------- -2.2%
Existing Home Sale - Yr/Yr Change-- -13.2%------------------------------------ -10.7%
The descent of the housing sector may be slowing, at least in August before September's crunch hit. Existing home sales did fall 2.2 percent in August to a 4.910 million unit rate, but a rate still in line with this year's trend. Condo sales, at -8.2 percent, showed an unusually steep drop in the month with single-family sales down a less alarming but still sizable -1.4 percent. Differences in regions were narrow with the Northeast and West showing mid single digit percentage declines and the Midwest and South both showing fractional gains.The year-on-year rate, helped by ever easier comparisons, is less frightening, at -10.7 percent in August for the least severe dip since July last year. Existing home sales began their uninterrupted run of year-on-year decreases in December 2005 -- a numbing, nearly three-year stretch that has ended up gutting the financial markets.The year-on-year decline of 9.5 percent is the most severe yet for the median price, now at $203,100. The month-on-month drop, at 3.4 percent, is the steepest of the year. Prices are being pressed down by a tide of distressed properties, sales of which the report said make up 35 to 40 percent of total sales. Prices have been in nearly uninterrupted decline for two years, hit by swelling supply which is at 10.4 months. But supply, at 4.255 million units, has at least been edging back the last couple of months.This report is mixed at the very best, with slowing rates of decline in sales offset by rising rates of decline in sale prices, the latter factor one that is certain to add further pressure to the credit markets. Markets, focused on bail-out talks in Washington, showed no reaction to the report.
Existing Home Sales - Level - SAAR---Previous---Consensus---Consensus Range---Actual
-------------------------------------5.00 M-----4.92M-------4.80M to 5.15M----4.91M
Existing Home Sales - M/M Change----3.1%-------------------------------------- -2.2%
Existing Home Sale - Yr/Yr Change-- -13.2%------------------------------------ -10.7%
The descent of the housing sector may be slowing, at least in August before September's crunch hit. Existing home sales did fall 2.2 percent in August to a 4.910 million unit rate, but a rate still in line with this year's trend. Condo sales, at -8.2 percent, showed an unusually steep drop in the month with single-family sales down a less alarming but still sizable -1.4 percent. Differences in regions were narrow with the Northeast and West showing mid single digit percentage declines and the Midwest and South both showing fractional gains.The year-on-year rate, helped by ever easier comparisons, is less frightening, at -10.7 percent in August for the least severe dip since July last year. Existing home sales began their uninterrupted run of year-on-year decreases in December 2005 -- a numbing, nearly three-year stretch that has ended up gutting the financial markets.The year-on-year decline of 9.5 percent is the most severe yet for the median price, now at $203,100. The month-on-month drop, at 3.4 percent, is the steepest of the year. Prices are being pressed down by a tide of distressed properties, sales of which the report said make up 35 to 40 percent of total sales. Prices have been in nearly uninterrupted decline for two years, hit by swelling supply which is at 10.4 months. But supply, at 4.255 million units, has at least been edging back the last couple of months.This report is mixed at the very best, with slowing rates of decline in sales offset by rising rates of decline in sale prices, the latter factor one that is certain to add further pressure to the credit markets. Markets, focused on bail-out talks in Washington, showed no reaction to the report.
Mortgage Loans And Yield Spread Premiums (aka Greed)
The YSP has caused part of the housing crisis. I will post further articles outlining this legalized abuse. (Tim)
Yield spread premium (YSP) is extra profit slipped into virtually every loan (calculated as percentage of your loan amount) which is created only by the loan originator locking and closing your loan at a higher than market rate.
For example, your loan amount is $200,000. The loan officer locks and closes you at 6.5% interest rate. The real market rate…the truthful rate…the rate you could have…should have had… was 6.0%. The spread between the rates yields a premium (another way of saying…money).
Hence the name Yield Spread Premium.
The .5% rate spread on average creates 2.0% of your loan amount as the yield spread premium profit. That means the loan officer made an extra $4,000 (2% x $200,000 loan amount) on your loan in addition to any origination, processing, application, or underwriting fees they disclosed on the Good Faith Estimate or closing statement.
Professor Howell Jackson of Harvard Law School said in testimony before Congress,
“…borrowers are simply told that their loans will have a certain interest rate, and they never understand that the interest rate is higher than it needs to be.”
Yield spread premium (YSP) is extra profit slipped into virtually every loan (calculated as percentage of your loan amount) which is created only by the loan originator locking and closing your loan at a higher than market rate.
For example, your loan amount is $200,000. The loan officer locks and closes you at 6.5% interest rate. The real market rate…the truthful rate…the rate you could have…should have had… was 6.0%. The spread between the rates yields a premium (another way of saying…money).
Hence the name Yield Spread Premium.
The .5% rate spread on average creates 2.0% of your loan amount as the yield spread premium profit. That means the loan officer made an extra $4,000 (2% x $200,000 loan amount) on your loan in addition to any origination, processing, application, or underwriting fees they disclosed on the Good Faith Estimate or closing statement.
Professor Howell Jackson of Harvard Law School said in testimony before Congress,
“…borrowers are simply told that their loans will have a certain interest rate, and they never understand that the interest rate is higher than it needs to be.”
Tuesday, September 23, 2008
This Week's Market Movers - Indicators
Released on 9/24/2008 10:00:00 AM For August, 2008
Existing Home Sales-----Previous---------Consensus---------Consensus Range
-------------------------5.00M-----------4.92M-------------4.80 to 5.15M
Market Consensus Before Announcement. Existing home sales rose 3.1 percent to a 5.0 million annual rate in July. But the rise did not make a dent in supply on the market, which was still severely bloated at 11.2 months and up from 11.1 months in June and 10.8 months in May. Unsold inventories continued to weigh on prices which fell 1.3 percent in the month to a median $212.4 million for a 7.1 percent year-on-year decline. There are mixed signals on whether sales will pick up further in August. The latest pending home sales index fell 3.2 percent in July while the Mortgage Bankers Association's purchase app
lications index was little changed over the month of August.
Released on 9/25/2008 8:30:00 AM For August, 2008
New Orders - M/M change-----Previous----------Consensus---------Consensus Range
---------------------------------1.3 %------------ -1.6%-------------- -5.9% to 0.6%
Market Consensus Before Announcement. Durable goods orders in July were surprisingly strong -- even after discounting a surge in aircraft orders. And businesses are looking past current weakness in the economy, continuing to invest in the economy. Durable goods orders advanced 1.4 percent in July and matching the 1.4 percent surge in June. Excluding the transportation component, new orders increased 0.7 percent, following a 2.6 percent jump in June. Strength was moderately widespread. July's gain was the largest since a 4.1 percent surge in December 2007. Apparently, exports are still providing support for the manufacturing sector along with a moderate uptrend in equipment investment in the U.S., despite a slowing in consumer spending. But the outlook is mixed, according to recent manufacturing surveys. The new orders index in the ISM manufacturing survey remained slightly negative in August while the same index in the Empire State Survey turned slightly positive in September (this report is based on responses from late August and early September). The Philly Fed's manufacturing survey for September showed a rise in new orders (also based on responses from late August and early September).
Released on 9/25/2008 10:00:00 AM For August, 2008
New Home Sales - Level- SAAR-----Previous----------Consensus---------Consensus Range
-------------------------------------515 K-------------510K--------------490K to 530K
Market Consensus Before Announcement. New home sales have been showing no sign of improvement while supply on the market is coming down. New home sales came in at a 515,000 annual unit rate in July and, importantly, sales for June and May were both revised lower by a combined 46,000 units. Year-on-year sales were down 35 percent. But homebuilders have been cutting back on construction as new homes on the market fell 23,000 in the month to 416,000, pulling down the months' supply to 10.1 from 10.7 in June and 10.8 in May. The median sales price rose 0.3 percent in the month but was down 6.3 percent on the year.
Existing Home Sales-----Previous---------Consensus---------Consensus Range
-------------------------5.00M-----------4.92M-------------4.80 to 5.15M
Market Consensus Before Announcement. Existing home sales rose 3.1 percent to a 5.0 million annual rate in July. But the rise did not make a dent in supply on the market, which was still severely bloated at 11.2 months and up from 11.1 months in June and 10.8 months in May. Unsold inventories continued to weigh on prices which fell 1.3 percent in the month to a median $212.4 million for a 7.1 percent year-on-year decline. There are mixed signals on whether sales will pick up further in August. The latest pending home sales index fell 3.2 percent in July while the Mortgage Bankers Association's purchase app
lications index was little changed over the month of August.Released on 9/25/2008 8:30:00 AM For August, 2008
New Orders - M/M change-----Previous----------Consensus---------Consensus Range
---------------------------------1.3 %------------ -1.6%-------------- -5.9% to 0.6%
Market Consensus Before Announcement. Durable goods orders in July were surprisingly strong -- even after discounting a surge in aircraft orders. And businesses are looking past current weakness in the economy, continuing to invest in the economy. Durable goods orders advanced 1.4 percent in July and matching the 1.4 percent surge in June. Excluding the transportation component, new orders increased 0.7 percent, following a 2.6 percent jump in June. Strength was moderately widespread. July's gain was the largest since a 4.1 percent surge in December 2007. Apparently, exports are still providing support for the manufacturing sector along with a moderate uptrend in equipment investment in the U.S., despite a slowing in consumer spending. But the outlook is mixed, according to recent manufacturing surveys. The new orders index in the ISM manufacturing survey remained slightly negative in August while the same index in the Empire State Survey turned slightly positive in September (this report is based on responses from late August and early September). The Philly Fed's manufacturing survey for September showed a rise in new orders (also based on responses from late August and early September).
Released on 9/25/2008 10:00:00 AM For August, 2008
New Home Sales - Level- SAAR-----Previous----------Consensus---------Consensus Range
-------------------------------------515 K-------------510K--------------490K to 530K
Market Consensus Before Announcement. New home sales have been showing no sign of improvement while supply on the market is coming down. New home sales came in at a 515,000 annual unit rate in July and, importantly, sales for June and May were both revised lower by a combined 46,000 units. Year-on-year sales were down 35 percent. But homebuilders have been cutting back on construction as new homes on the market fell 23,000 in the month to 416,000, pulling down the months' supply to 10.1 from 10.7 in June and 10.8 in May. The median sales price rose 0.3 percent in the month but was down 6.3 percent on the year.
The Housing And Credit Meltdown - How We got In This Mess
There are as many starting points for the mortgage meltdown as there are fears about how far it has yet to go, but one decisive point of departure is the final years of the Clinton administration, when a kid from Queens without any real banking or real-estate experience was the only man in Washington with the power to regulate the giants of home finance, the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC), better known as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
Andrew Cuomo, the youngest Housing and Urban Development secretary in history, made a series of decisions between 1997 and 2001 that gave birth to the country's current crisis. He took actions that—in combination with many other factors—helped plunge Fannie and Freddie into the subprime markets without putting in place the means to monitor their increasingly risky investments. He turned the Federal Housing Administration mortgage program into a sweetheart lender with sky-high loan ceilings and no money down, and he legalized what a federal judge has branded "kickbacks" to brokers that have fueled the sale of overpriced and unsupportable loans. Three to four million families are now facing foreclosure, and Cuomo is one of the reasons why.
What he did is important—not just because of what it tells us about how we got in this hole, but because of what it says about New York's attorney general, who has been trying for months to don a white hat in the subprime scandal, pursuing cases against banks, appraisers, brokers, rating agencies, and multitrillion-dollar, quasi-public Fannie and Freddie.
It all starts, as the headlines of recent weeks do, with these two giant banks. But in the hubbub about their bailout, few have noticed that the only federal agency with the power to regulate what Cuomo has called "the gods of Washington" was HUD. Congress granted that power in 1992, so there were only four pre-crisis secretaries at the notoriously political agency that had the ability to rein in Fannie and Freddie: ex–Texas mayor Henry Cisneros and Bush confidante Alfonso Jackson, who were driven from office by criminal investigations; Mel Martinez, who left to chase a U.S. Senate seat in Florida; and Cuomo, who used the agency as a launching pad for his disastrous 2002 gubernatorial candidacy.
With that many pols at the helm, it's no wonder that most analysts have portrayed Fannie and Freddie as if they were unregulated renegades, and rarely mentioned HUD in the ongoing finger-pointing exercise that has ranged, appropriately enough, from Wall Street to Alan Greenspan. But the near-collapse of these dual pillars in recent weeks is rooted in the HUD junkyard, where every Cuomo decision discussed here was later ratified by his Bush successors.
In 2000, Cuomo required a quantum leap in the number of affordable, low-to-moderate-income loans that the two mortgage banks—known collectively as Government Sponsored Enterprises—would have to buy. The GSEs don't actually sell mortgages to borrowers. They buy them from banks and mortgage companies, allowing lenders to replenish their capital and make more loans. They also purchase mortgage-backed securities, which are pools of mortgages regularly acquired by the GSEs from investment firms. The government chartered these banks to pump money into the mortgage market and, while they did it, to make a strong enough profit to attract shareholders. That created a tug-of-war between their efforts to maximize shareholder value, which drove them toward high-end mortgages, and their congressionally mandated obligation to finance loans for those who needed help. The 1992 law required HUD's secretary to make sure housing goals were being met and, every four years, set new goals for Fannie and Freddie.
But raising the affordable-housing goals was only half the Cuomo story.
The HUD secretary is also required to produce voluminous rules that govern how the GSEs meet those goals, and the 187-page rules Cuomo issued opened the door to abuse.
The rules explicitly rejected the idea of imposing any new reporting requirements on the GSEs. In other words, HUD wanted Fannie and Freddie to buy risky loans, but the department didn't want to hear just how risky they were.
HUD conceded in the rules that many consumer groups had urged it to insist that the GSEs provide "loan-level data" revealing how many of their loans contained high interest rates, prepayment penalties, or other requirements that presaged bad loans.
Indeed, in March 2000, HUD had acknowledged that the new goal-driven pressure on the GSEs might "warrant increased monitoring and additional reporting." But when the final rules were adopted in October, that momentary caution had been abandoned: "HUD is not establishing any requirements for additional data to carry out this rule." The report explained that the GSEs "objected" to information mandates "related to their purchases of high-cost mortgages," so HUD decided against imposing "an undue additional burden." HUD would have no way of telling how abusive the low-income mortgages it was mandating might be.
Follow this link for the complete story.
http://www.villagevoice.com/2008-08-05/news/how-andrew-cuomo-gave-birth-to-the-crisis-at-fannie-mae-and-freddie-mac/
Andrew Cuomo, the youngest Housing and Urban Development secretary in history, made a series of decisions between 1997 and 2001 that gave birth to the country's current crisis. He took actions that—in combination with many other factors—helped plunge Fannie and Freddie into the subprime markets without putting in place the means to monitor their increasingly risky investments. He turned the Federal Housing Administration mortgage program into a sweetheart lender with sky-high loan ceilings and no money down, and he legalized what a federal judge has branded "kickbacks" to brokers that have fueled the sale of overpriced and unsupportable loans. Three to four million families are now facing foreclosure, and Cuomo is one of the reasons why.
What he did is important—not just because of what it tells us about how we got in this hole, but because of what it says about New York's attorney general, who has been trying for months to don a white hat in the subprime scandal, pursuing cases against banks, appraisers, brokers, rating agencies, and multitrillion-dollar, quasi-public Fannie and Freddie.
It all starts, as the headlines of recent weeks do, with these two giant banks. But in the hubbub about their bailout, few have noticed that the only federal agency with the power to regulate what Cuomo has called "the gods of Washington" was HUD. Congress granted that power in 1992, so there were only four pre-crisis secretaries at the notoriously political agency that had the ability to rein in Fannie and Freddie: ex–Texas mayor Henry Cisneros and Bush confidante Alfonso Jackson, who were driven from office by criminal investigations; Mel Martinez, who left to chase a U.S. Senate seat in Florida; and Cuomo, who used the agency as a launching pad for his disastrous 2002 gubernatorial candidacy.
With that many pols at the helm, it's no wonder that most analysts have portrayed Fannie and Freddie as if they were unregulated renegades, and rarely mentioned HUD in the ongoing finger-pointing exercise that has ranged, appropriately enough, from Wall Street to Alan Greenspan. But the near-collapse of these dual pillars in recent weeks is rooted in the HUD junkyard, where every Cuomo decision discussed here was later ratified by his Bush successors.
In 2000, Cuomo required a quantum leap in the number of affordable, low-to-moderate-income loans that the two mortgage banks—known collectively as Government Sponsored Enterprises—would have to buy. The GSEs don't actually sell mortgages to borrowers. They buy them from banks and mortgage companies, allowing lenders to replenish their capital and make more loans. They also purchase mortgage-backed securities, which are pools of mortgages regularly acquired by the GSEs from investment firms. The government chartered these banks to pump money into the mortgage market and, while they did it, to make a strong enough profit to attract shareholders. That created a tug-of-war between their efforts to maximize shareholder value, which drove them toward high-end mortgages, and their congressionally mandated obligation to finance loans for those who needed help. The 1992 law required HUD's secretary to make sure housing goals were being met and, every four years, set new goals for Fannie and Freddie.
But raising the affordable-housing goals was only half the Cuomo story.
The HUD secretary is also required to produce voluminous rules that govern how the GSEs meet those goals, and the 187-page rules Cuomo issued opened the door to abuse.
The rules explicitly rejected the idea of imposing any new reporting requirements on the GSEs. In other words, HUD wanted Fannie and Freddie to buy risky loans, but the department didn't want to hear just how risky they were.
HUD conceded in the rules that many consumer groups had urged it to insist that the GSEs provide "loan-level data" revealing how many of their loans contained high interest rates, prepayment penalties, or other requirements that presaged bad loans.
Indeed, in March 2000, HUD had acknowledged that the new goal-driven pressure on the GSEs might "warrant increased monitoring and additional reporting." But when the final rules were adopted in October, that momentary caution had been abandoned: "HUD is not establishing any requirements for additional data to carry out this rule." The report explained that the GSEs "objected" to information mandates "related to their purchases of high-cost mortgages," so HUD decided against imposing "an undue additional burden." HUD would have no way of telling how abusive the low-income mortgages it was mandating might be.
Follow this link for the complete story.
http://www.villagevoice.com/2008-08-05/news/how-andrew-cuomo-gave-birth-to-the-crisis-at-fannie-mae-and-freddie-mac/
Wednesday, September 10, 2008
Fannie Mae Primer

Both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are US government "sponsored" home loan banks. Each of them have formal names, but are primarily known by their nicknames.
In fact, both these institutions prefer to go by their nicknames rather than their official names. That's like the US government going by "Uncle Sam" all the time.
Fannie Mae was created by the government in 1938 to guarantee mortgage loans made by private banks.
After the Great Depression, which was characterised by bank failures on the one hand, and substantial losses of income on the part of large number of households on the other, the private mortgage market was providing mortgage loans to too few households.
The objective of the Roosevelt Administration was to restore widespread homeownership, which had become almost an ideology in the United States from early on in the twentieth century.
Thirty years later, in 1968, the government freed Fannie Mae from its control and privatized it with a Congressional charter. It became just like any other bank, except that it still did not make mortgage loans directly to the public. Instead, it bought up what is called the "secondary" market - the mortgages which had already been made by the private banks.
Two years later, in 1970, the US government created Freddie Mac, an exact duplicate of Fannie Mae. The reason behind a second institution was that high economic growth of the 1960s had led to rising incomes and the resulting widespread homeownership made just one government sponsored mortgage institution, namely Fannie Mae, unappealingly, if not scarily, large.
Both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have been private enterprises since then, up until September 7, 2008.
They have stockholders who provide the equity capital, they both sell bonds to raise funds, and they both pay for their operations out of their profits. There has been no money paid by the American taxpayers to these two institutions.
The two were "sponsored" banks, meaning that there was an implicit guarantee from the US government that it would not allow these two institutions to fail.
In fact, both these institutions prefer to go by their nicknames rather than their official names. That's like the US government going by "Uncle Sam" all the time.
Fannie Mae was created by the government in 1938 to guarantee mortgage loans made by private banks.
After the Great Depression, which was characterised by bank failures on the one hand, and substantial losses of income on the part of large number of households on the other, the private mortgage market was providing mortgage loans to too few households.
The objective of the Roosevelt Administration was to restore widespread homeownership, which had become almost an ideology in the United States from early on in the twentieth century.
Thirty years later, in 1968, the government freed Fannie Mae from its control and privatized it with a Congressional charter. It became just like any other bank, except that it still did not make mortgage loans directly to the public. Instead, it bought up what is called the "secondary" market - the mortgages which had already been made by the private banks.
Two years later, in 1970, the US government created Freddie Mac, an exact duplicate of Fannie Mae. The reason behind a second institution was that high economic growth of the 1960s had led to rising incomes and the resulting widespread homeownership made just one government sponsored mortgage institution, namely Fannie Mae, unappealingly, if not scarily, large.
Both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have been private enterprises since then, up until September 7, 2008.
They have stockholders who provide the equity capital, they both sell bonds to raise funds, and they both pay for their operations out of their profits. There has been no money paid by the American taxpayers to these two institutions.
The two were "sponsored" banks, meaning that there was an implicit guarantee from the US government that it would not allow these two institutions to fail.
What is it exactly that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac do?
As stated above, the principal act that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are mandated to do, is to buy mortgages from private banks. The private banks, meanwhile, make mortgage loans with the comfort of knowing that they will be able turn around and sell those loans to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
This "comfort" has two aspects. First, the banks which make the initial loans in the primary market get their liquidity back when they sell off their mortgages in the secondary market to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
They can, therefore, make fresh mortgages to new customers with the funds they received from selling the previous mortgages, thereby making it possible for greater homeownership.
The second benefit that private banks get from the existence of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is that they can offer mortgages to middle class and low income households at affordable interest rates with the sure knowledge that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac will take those mortgages over.
Where do Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac get the funds to buy these mortgages from the private banks? They raise funds first by issuing bonds on Wall Street just like any private company.
Then, in addition, they sell some of their mortgage holdings in the "tertiary" markets. They pool together a lot of mortgages and create a marketable security. These are called mortgage backed securities (MBS). If any household, whose mortgage is part of a MBS, fails to pay its mortgage obligation for, say, a month, then Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, whoever is the relevant party, will make good the payment to the MBS holder.
Similarly, if there is a foreclosure and the sale price of the distress sale ends up being less than the value of the mortgage, then Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac will make up the difference.
A lot of these MBS are sold in foreign markets, especially to central banks with large US dollar holdings. The central bank of China is reputed to be holding $340 billion worth of MBS.
That is why Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac cannot be allowed to fail. The mortgage defaults and foreclosures in the US will hit the Asian central banks among others. The defaults on MBS backed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac will be looked upon the world as almost equivalent to a default by the US government on US treasury bonds. Even the thought of such a possibility is too scary.
Freddie Mac Primer
The Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC) (NYSE: FRE), commonly known as Freddie Mac, is a privately-owned and run government sponsored enterprise (GSE) of the United States federal government. It is a stockholder-owned corporation, authorized to make loans and loan guarantees.
The FHLMC was created in 1970 to expand the secondary market for mortgages in the US. Along with other GSEs, Freddie Mac buys mortgages on the secondary market, pools them, and sells them as mortgage-backed securities to investors on the open market. This secondary mortgage market increases the supply of money available for mortgages lending and increases the money available for new home purchases. The name "Freddie Mac" is a creative acronym of the company's full name that has been adopted officially for ease of identification (see "GSEs" below for other examples).
On September 7, 2008, Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) director James B. Lockhart III announced he had put Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac under the conservatorship of the FHFA (see Federal takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac). The action is "one of the most sweeping government interventions in private financial markets in decades".[1][2][3]
Moody's gave Freddie Mac securities an investment grade rating of A1 until August 22, 2008 when Warren Buffett said publicly that both Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae had tried to attract him and others. Moody's changed the rating that day to Baa3 high-yield junk bonds.[4] As of the start of the conservatorship, the United States Department of the Treasury had contracted to acquire US$1 billion in Freddie Mac senior preferred stock, paying at a rate of 10 percent a year, and the total investment may subsequently rise to as much as US$ 100 billion.[5]
Home loan interest rates may go down as a result, and owners of Freddie Mac debt and the Asian central banks who had increased their holdings in these bonds may be protected. Shares of Freddie Mac stock, however, on September 8, 2008 were worth about one U.S. dollar. On the same day the U.S dollar increased in value compared to yen and euros. The yield on U.S Treasury securities rose in anticipation of increased U.S. federal debt.[6]
Freddie Mac's primary method of making money is by charging a guarantee fee on loans that it has purchased and securitized into mortgage-backed security bonds. Investors, or purchasers of Freddie Mac MBS, are willing to let Freddie Mac keep this fee in exchange for assuming the credit risk, that is, Freddie Mac's guarantee that the principal and interest on the underlying loan will be paid back regardless of whether the borrower actually repays.
Officially, Freddie Mac is not given any backing, insurance, or statutory support by the US Government. Unofficially, it has long been assumed that the corporation, along with its sister GSE, the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), were "too big to fail". Both companies often benefited from an implied guarantee of fitness equivalent to truly federally-backed financial groups.
As of 2008, the Federal National Mortgage Association and Freddie Mac owned or guaranteed about half of the U.S.'s $12 trillion mortgage market.[15] This made both corporations highly susceptible to the subprime mortgage crisis of that year. Ultimately, in July of that year, the speculation was made reality, when the US government took action to prevent the collapse of both corporations. The Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve took several steps to bolster confidence in the corporations, including extending credit limits, granting both corporations access to Federal Reserve low-interest loans (at similar rates as commercial banks), and potentially allowing the Treasury Department to own stock.[16] This event also renewed calls for stronger regulation of GSEs by the government.
The FHLMC was created in 1970 to expand the secondary market for mortgages in the US. Along with other GSEs, Freddie Mac buys mortgages on the secondary market, pools them, and sells them as mortgage-backed securities to investors on the open market. This secondary mortgage market increases the supply of money available for mortgages lending and increases the money available for new home purchases. The name "Freddie Mac" is a creative acronym of the company's full name that has been adopted officially for ease of identification (see "GSEs" below for other examples).
On September 7, 2008, Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) director James B. Lockhart III announced he had put Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac under the conservatorship of the FHFA (see Federal takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac). The action is "one of the most sweeping government interventions in private financial markets in decades".[1][2][3]
Moody's gave Freddie Mac securities an investment grade rating of A1 until August 22, 2008 when Warren Buffett said publicly that both Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae had tried to attract him and others. Moody's changed the rating that day to Baa3 high-yield junk bonds.[4] As of the start of the conservatorship, the United States Department of the Treasury had contracted to acquire US$1 billion in Freddie Mac senior preferred stock, paying at a rate of 10 percent a year, and the total investment may subsequently rise to as much as US$ 100 billion.[5]
Home loan interest rates may go down as a result, and owners of Freddie Mac debt and the Asian central banks who had increased their holdings in these bonds may be protected. Shares of Freddie Mac stock, however, on September 8, 2008 were worth about one U.S. dollar. On the same day the U.S dollar increased in value compared to yen and euros. The yield on U.S Treasury securities rose in anticipation of increased U.S. federal debt.[6]
Freddie Mac's primary method of making money is by charging a guarantee fee on loans that it has purchased and securitized into mortgage-backed security bonds. Investors, or purchasers of Freddie Mac MBS, are willing to let Freddie Mac keep this fee in exchange for assuming the credit risk, that is, Freddie Mac's guarantee that the principal and interest on the underlying loan will be paid back regardless of whether the borrower actually repays.
Officially, Freddie Mac is not given any backing, insurance, or statutory support by the US Government. Unofficially, it has long been assumed that the corporation, along with its sister GSE, the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), were "too big to fail". Both companies often benefited from an implied guarantee of fitness equivalent to truly federally-backed financial groups.
As of 2008, the Federal National Mortgage Association and Freddie Mac owned or guaranteed about half of the U.S.'s $12 trillion mortgage market.[15] This made both corporations highly susceptible to the subprime mortgage crisis of that year. Ultimately, in July of that year, the speculation was made reality, when the US government took action to prevent the collapse of both corporations. The Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve took several steps to bolster confidence in the corporations, including extending credit limits, granting both corporations access to Federal Reserve low-interest loans (at similar rates as commercial banks), and potentially allowing the Treasury Department to own stock.[16] This event also renewed calls for stronger regulation of GSEs by the government.
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