More From Bill Gross

How Main Street Will Profit

Capitalism is a delicate balance between production and finance. Today, our seemingly guaranteed living standard is threatened, much like it has been in previous recessions or, some would say, the Depression. Finance has run amok because of oversecuritization, poor regulation and the excessively exuberant spirits of investors; the delicate balance has once again been disrupted; production, and with it jobs and our national standard of living, is declining.

If this were a textbook recession, policy prescriptions would recommend two aspirin and bed rest -- a healthy dose of interest rate cuts and a fiscal package that mildly expanded the deficit. That, of course, has been the attempted remedy over the past 12 months. But recent events have made it apparent that this downturn differs from recessions past. Today's housing bubble, unlike that of the stock market's before it, was financed with excessive and poorly regulated mortgage debt, and as housing prices began to tumble from the peak, the delinquencies and foreclosures have led to a downward spiral of debt liquidation that in turn led to even lower prices and more foreclosures.

And so, instead of mild medication and rest, it became apparent that quadruple bypass surgery is necessary. The extreme measures are extended government guarantees and the formation of an RTC-like holding company housed within the Treasury. Critics call this a bailout of Wall Street; in fact, it is anything but. I estimate the average price of distressed mortgages that pass from "troubled financial institutions" to the Treasury at auction will be 65 cents on the dollar, representing a loss of one-third of the original purchase price to the seller, and a prospective yield of 10 to 15 percent to the Treasury. Financed at 3 to 4 percent via the sale of Treasury bonds, the Treasury will therefore be in a position to earn a positive carry or yield spread of at least 7 to 8 percent. Calls for appropriate oversight of this auction process are more than justified. There are disinterested firms, some not even based on Wall Street, with the expertise to evaluate these complicated pools of mortgages and other assets to assure taxpayers that their money is being wisely invested. My estimate of double-digit returns assumes lengthy ownership of the assets and is in turn dependent on the level of home foreclosures, but this program is, in fact, directed to prevent just that.

In effect, the Treasury will have the fate of the American taxpayer in its hands. The Resolution Trust Corp., created in the late 1980s to deal with the savings and loan crisis, dealt with previously purchased real estate, which was flushed into government hands with a "best efforts" future liquidation. Today, the purchase of junk mortgages, securitized credit card receivables and even student loans will be bought at prices significantly below "par" or cost, and prospectively at levels allowing for capital gains. This is a Wall Street-friendly package only to the extent that it frees up funds for future loans and economic growth. Politicians afraid of parallels to legislation that enabled the Iraq war are raising concerns about a rush to judgment, but the need for speed is clear. In this case, there really are weapons of mass destruction -- financial derivatives -- that threaten to destroy our system from within. Move quickly, Washington, with appropriate safeguards.
The Treasury proposal will not be a bailout of Wall Street but a rescue of Main Street, as lending capacity and confidence is restored to our banks and the delicate balance between production and finance is given a chance to work its magic. Democratic Party earmarks mandating forbearance on home mortgage foreclosures will be critical as well. If this program is successful, however, it is obvious that the free market and Wild West capitalism of recent decades will be forever changed. Future economic textbooks are likely to teach that while capitalism is the most dynamic and productive system ever conceived, it is most efficient over the long term when there is another delicate balance -- between private incentive and government oversight.
The writer is chief investment officer and founder of the investment management firm PIMCO.

Bill Gross On The Bailout

NEW YORK - The Treasury's proposed $700 billion bailout for financial firms could yield a profit of at least 7 percent to 8 percent and benefit taxpayers, Bill Gross, who manages the world's biggest bond fund, wrote in an opinion piece in The Washington Post on Wednesday.
Gross, the chief investment officer of Pacific Investment Management Co., or Pimco, estimates the average price of distressed mortgages that pass from "troubled financial institutions" to the Treasury at auction will be 65 cents on the dollar. That will represent a loss of one-third of the original purchase price to the seller, and a prospective yield of 10 percent to 15 percent to the Treasury, Gross said.

"Financed at 3 percent to 4 percent via the sale of Treasury bonds, the Treasury will therefore be in a position to earn a positive carry or yield spread of at least 7 percent to 8 percent," Gross argued. "The Treasury proposal will not be a bailout of Wall Street but a rescue of Main Street, as lending capacity and confidence is restored to our banks and the delicate balance between production and finance is given a chance to work its magic," Gross added.
The last few weeks have been marked by the U.S. takeovers of mortgage companies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac the government bailout of insurer American International Group Inc , the bankruptcy filing of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc , and the pending sale of Merrill Lynch & Co Inc to Bank of America Corp .
U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke are pushing Congress to approve a taxpayer-funded plan, estimated at roughly $700 billion, that would let the government buy illiquid assets from lenders.
Gross' estimate of double-digit returns in scooped up mortgage securities assumes lengthy ownership of the assets and is in turn dependent on the level of home foreclosures, "but the Treasury's program is, in fact, directed to prevent just that," he added. Gross manages the $133 billion Pimco Total Return Fund and helps oversee the more than $812 billion in assets at Pimco.

Buffett Bets On Goldman Sachs

Posted By:Alex Crippen

In a surprise return to Wall Street, Warren Buffett's Berkshire Hathaway has a deal to invest at least $5 billion in Goldman Sachs.
Up until now, he has rejected all pleas to come to Wall Street's aid during the current crisis.
Goldman revealed the vote of confidence from the man generally considered the world's greatest investor late this afternoon in a news release.
Berkshire will buy $5 in preferred Goldman stock with a dividend of 10 percent. It will also get warrants to buy another $5 in common stock over five years.
Buffett has avoided Wall Street since he came to Salomon Brothers' aid as a hands-on manager when it was hit by a trading scandal in 1991. He had bought a $700 million stake in the company four years before.
He eventually turned a profit on the investment, but it was a long and difficult experience for him, making tonight's news especially unexpected.
In a brief off-camera telephone conversation tonight, Buffett told CNBC's Becky Quick he loves the terms of the deal and he loves Goldman.
(It's important to note that Buffett got a much better deal than any individual investor could hope for.)
Even so, Becky tells me she's "stunned" by this development, and I am too. Neither of us can believe it just now.
Becky jokes she would have predicted that Buffett would buy a stake in Pepsi, arch-rival of his beloved Coca-Cola, before he put money into a Wall Street firm again.
She expects to speak extensively with Buffett live on the air tomorrow (Wednesday) morning just after 8a ET on Squawk Box.
They'll cover the Goldman investment as well as everything else that's happening in the financial world right now, including his support of the administration's increasingly controversial bailout plan.
While Buffett came to New York to help run Salomon years ago, its inconceivable that he would leave Omaha this time around to pitch in at Goldman's executive suite.
Buffett is quoted in the release with some very positive comments about Goldman, which recently converted from an investment bank to a bank holding company.

"Goldman Sachs is an exceptional institution. It has an unrivaled global franchise, a proven and deep management team and the intellectual and financial capital to continue its track record of outperformance.”
Goldman CEO Lloyd Blankfein returns the favor in his quote. "We are pleased that given our longstanding relationship, Warren Buffett, arguably the world’s most admired and successful investor, has decided to make such a significant investment in Goldman Sachs. We view it as a strong validation of our client franchise and future prospects. This investment will further bolster our strong capitalization and liquidity position."
Berkshire will also receive warrants to purchase $5 billion of common stock with a strike price of $115 a share. The warrants can be used at any time over a five year period.
In addition, Goldman will raise at least $2.5 billion in common equity through a public offering.

The Housing And Credit Meltdown - How We got In This Mess

There are as many starting points for the mortgage meltdown as there are fears about how far it has yet to go, but one decisive point of departure is the final years of the Clinton administration, when a kid from Queens without any real banking or real-estate experience was the only man in Washington with the power to regulate the giants of home finance, the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC), better known as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
Andrew Cuomo, the youngest Housing and Urban Development secretary in history, made a series of decisions between 1997 and 2001 that gave birth to the country's current crisis. He took actions that—in combination with many other factors—helped plunge Fannie and Freddie into the subprime markets without putting in place the means to monitor their increasingly risky investments. He turned the Federal Housing Administration mortgage program into a sweetheart lender with sky-high loan ceilings and no money down, and he legalized what a federal judge has branded "kickbacks" to brokers that have fueled the sale of overpriced and unsupportable loans. Three to four million families are now facing foreclosure, and Cuomo is one of the reasons why.
What he did is important—not just because of what it tells us about how we got in this hole, but because of what it says about New York's attorney general, who has been trying for months to don a white hat in the subprime scandal, pursuing cases against banks, appraisers, brokers, rating agencies, and multitrillion-dollar, quasi-public Fannie and Freddie.
It all starts, as the headlines of recent weeks do, with these two giant banks. But in the hubbub about their bailout, few have noticed that the only federal agency with the power to regulate what Cuomo has called "the gods of Washington" was HUD. Congress granted that power in 1992, so there were only four pre-crisis secretaries at the notoriously political agency that had the ability to rein in Fannie and Freddie: ex–Texas mayor Henry Cisneros and Bush confidante Alfonso Jackson, who were driven from office by criminal investigations; Mel Martinez, who left to chase a U.S. Senate seat in Florida; and Cuomo, who used the agency as a launching pad for his disastrous 2002 gubernatorial candidacy.
With that many pols at the helm, it's no wonder that most analysts have portrayed Fannie and Freddie as if they were unregulated renegades, and rarely mentioned HUD in the ongoing finger-pointing exercise that has ranged, appropriately enough, from Wall Street to Alan Greenspan. But the near-collapse of these dual pillars in recent weeks is rooted in the HUD junkyard, where every Cuomo decision discussed here was later ratified by his Bush successors.

In 2000, Cuomo required a quantum leap in the number of affordable, low-to-moderate-income loans that the two mortgage banks—known collectively as Government Sponsored Enterprises—would have to buy. The GSEs don't actually sell mortgages to borrowers. They buy them from banks and mortgage companies, allowing lenders to replenish their capital and make more loans. They also purchase mortgage-backed securities, which are pools of mortgages regularly acquired by the GSEs from investment firms. The government chartered these banks to pump money into the mortgage market and, while they did it, to make a strong enough profit to attract shareholders. That created a tug-of-war between their efforts to maximize shareholder value, which drove them toward high-end mortgages, and their congressionally mandated obligation to finance loans for those who needed help. The 1992 law required HUD's secretary to make sure housing goals were being met and, every four years, set new goals for Fannie and Freddie.

But raising the affordable-housing goals was only half the Cuomo story.
The HUD secretary is also required to produce voluminous rules that govern how the GSEs meet those goals, and the 187-page rules Cuomo issued opened the door to abuse.
The rules explicitly rejected the idea of imposing any new reporting requirements on the GSEs. In other words, HUD wanted Fannie and Freddie to buy risky loans, but the department didn't want to hear just how risky they were.
HUD conceded in the rules that many consumer groups had urged it to insist that the GSEs provide "loan-level data" revealing how many of their loans contained high interest rates, prepayment penalties, or other requirements that presaged bad loans.
Indeed, in March 2000, HUD had acknowledged that the new goal-driven pressure on the GSEs might "warrant increased monitoring and additional reporting." But when the final rules were adopted in October, that momentary caution had been abandoned: "HUD is not establishing any requirements for additional data to carry out this rule." The report explained that the GSEs "objected" to information mandates "related to their purchases of high-cost mortgages," so HUD decided against imposing "an undue additional burden." HUD would have no way of telling how abusive the low-income mortgages it was mandating might be.

Follow this link for the complete story.

http://www.villagevoice.com/2008-08-05/news/how-andrew-cuomo-gave-birth-to-the-crisis-at-fannie-mae-and-freddie-mac/